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Abstract
One of the main areas in knowledge representation and logic-based artificial
intelligence concerns logical formalisms that can be used for representing and
reasoning with concepts. For almost 30 years, since research in this area
began, the issue of intensionality has had a special status in that it has been
considered to play an important role, yet it has not been precisely established
what it means for a logical formalism to be intensional. This thesis attempts
to set matters straight. Based on studies of the main contributions to the
issue of intensionality from philosophy of language, in particular the works
of Gottlob Frege and Rudolf Carnap, we start by defining when a logical
formalism is intensional. We then examine whether the current formalizations
of concepts are intensional. The result is negative in the sense that none of
the prevalent formalizations are intensional. This motivates the development
of intensional logics for concepts. Our main contribution is the presentation
of such an intensional concept logic.
The intensional concept logic is a development of the well-known descrip-
tion logic ALC. More precisely, the logic is based, not only on a single, but
on two equivalence relations. This allows us to express that concepts are
co-extensional as well as to express that concepts are co-intensional. The in-
tensional semantics of the logic is a novel algebraic semantics which is defined
through abstraction of the extensional semantics of ALC. It is shown that
this approach generalizes to other logics than description logics.
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Resume´
Et af hovedomr˚aderne inden for vidensrepræsentation og logikbaseret kuns-
tig intelligens omhandler logiske formalismer, der er velegnede til at repræ-
sentere begreber og til at foretage logiske slutninger, som involverer begreber.
I næsten 30 a˚r, siden forskning i dette emne begyndte, har problemstillingen
intensionalitet haft en særstatus, idet den er blevet betragtet som værende
vigtig, alligevel er det ikke blevet præcist fastlagt, hvad det vil sige, at en
logisk formalisme er intensionel. Denne afhandling forsøger at r˚ade bod p˚a
dette. Med udgangspunkt i hovedbidragene til intensionalitet, der stammer
fra Gottlob Frege og Rudolf Carnap, starter vi med at definere, hvorn˚ar en lo-
gisk formalisme er intensionel. Derefter undersøger vi, hvorvidt de nuværende
formaliseringer af begrebsviden er intensionelle. Resultatet er negativt, idet
ingen af de fremherskende formaliseringer er intensionelle. Dette motiverer
udviklingen af intensionelle logikker, der kan h˚andtere begrebsviden. Denne
afhandlings hovedbidrag er en præsentation af en s˚adan intensionel begrebs-
logik.
Den intensionelle begrebslogik er en videreudvikling af den velkendte be-
skrivelseslogik ALC. Den intensionelle logik er baseret p˚a ikke alene e´n, men
to ækvivalensrelationer, hvorved vi b˚ade kan udtrykke, at begreber har samme
ekstension, samt at begreber har samme intension. Den intensionelle seman-
tik er en ny algebraisk semantik, der er defineret ved generalisering af den
ekstensionelle semantik af ALC. Det vises, at denne fremgangsm˚ade kan
generaliseres til andre logikker.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We can systematically organize the entities of a given domain into so-called
categories or classes. When examining living organisms, for example, we com-
monly categorize those with a capacity for moving around as being animal and
those without as being plant. Living organisms may therefore be divided into
two categories, moreover, the categories animal and plant can be considered
subcategories of living organism.
At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been acknowledged that cate-
gories play a fundamental role in the organization and formulation of knowl-
edge. Categorization in general is a broad area indeed. We are working in the
field of knowledge representation and logic-based artificial intelligence. Cate-
gories and classes will accordingly be referred to as concepts. The subject of
this thesis is concept representation and reasoning, or more precisely, logics
suitable for representing and reasoning with concepts.
Today, research on this subject enjoys renewed popularity. In particular,
specifications of concepts—the so-called ontologies—are studied intensively.
As an example of a graphical ontology in which animal and plant are subcon-
cepts of (subsumed by) living organism, we have
living organism
animal
77nnnnnnnnnnnn
plant
ggOOOOOOOOOOO
Ontologies are often much more complex but an ordering of concepts, like the
12 Introduction
one above, is common to all of them. Such an ordering is called a taxonomy.
The reason for the interest in concept representation is, among other
things, caused by the need for organizing the vast amount of information
on the Internet. However, due to the fundamental role concepts play with
respect to organization of knowledge, it should be clear that the range of
applications of theories for concept representation and reasoning is wider.
Compared to other contributions in knowledge representation, this thesis
is distinguished by intensional formalization of concepts. As it is not yet
established what it precisely means for a formalization to be intensional, the
first major aim of the thesis is to present a formal definition of when a logic
is intensional. In order to accomplish this, we will go back to the origin
and study contributions from philosophy of language, notably the works of
Gottlob Frege and Rudolf Carnap.
Now we present an introduction to the subject of intensionality. Intension-
ality is basically about understanding languages, that is, about establishing
linguistic meaning. And one of the first things we observe is that in order to
understand what a sentence like
Don Quixote is mad
means, one must know what its expressions denote.1 Don Quixote denotes the
main character of the novel of the same name authored by Miguel de Cervantes
Saavedra. Thus the sentence bluntly asserts that the main character of the
novel Don Quixote suffers from a disordered mind.
Knowledge about denotation is not sufficient for understanding a language
in general. To see this, let us assume the converse, i.e. that it suffices to know
the denotations of the expressions of a sentence in order to determine its
meaning, and let us compare the two names Knight of the Rueful Countenance
and Knight of the Lions. Since both are names of Don Quixote, they both
denote the character Don Quixote. But then the two sentences
(i) after having confronted a pair of lions, Don Quixote calls him-
self the Knight of the Lions,
(ii) after having confronted a pair of lions, Don Quixote calls him-
self the Knight of the Rueful Countenance
must have the same meaning, since the subexpressions of the two sentences are
pairwise co-denotational. But this cannot be the case, because according to
1Instead of using ’denote’ we could also use ’refer to’, however, we adopt the terminology
used by many authors in philosophy of language, like Bertrand Russell and Alonzo Church.
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the novel the former is true and the latter is false, and no two sentences which
mean the same can have different truth-values. Hence (i) and (ii) cannot have
the same meaning. In other words, although we have not established how
to determine linguistic meaning (which is difficult indeed), we have argued
that linguistic meaning in general cannot be reduced to knowledge about
denotations.
According to Gottlob Frege it is also necessary to know the so-called sense
of an expression in order to determine linguistic meaning. This will be ex-
plained in details in the following chapter, but for now we say that the sense
of an expression is the way in which the expression denotes, or simply its mode
of presentation. Consider once again Knight of the Rueful Countenance and
Knight of the Lions. They denote (i.e. refer to) Don Quixote in different ways.
The first refers to his appearance, and the latter to his unrivalled courage,
hence the names have different senses.
This should illustrate why intensionality is important for semantics, but
it does not explain why we as computer scientists working with conceptual
knowledge representation are interested in intensionality.
We have basically argued that the meaning of an expression is more than
its denotation. A similar argument can now be presented for concepts, but
first it should be noted that a different terminology is used for talking about
what concepts mean. Instead of talking about the denotation of a concept, we
talk about the extension of a concept and instead of the sense of a concept, we
talk about the intension of a concept.2 The extension of a concept is accord-
ingly the set of individuals falling under the concept, that is, the members of
the concept. The intension of a concept is closely related to the sense of a
name, which suggests that the intension is something like the way in which
the concept refers to its members or simply its mode of presentation. More
precisely, we will later say that a concept is defined, not by its extension,
but by its intension, and this merely means that we use a more restrictive
condition for identifying concepts than simply assuming that concepts with
the same extension are identical.
Just as there exist co-denotational names with different senses, there exist
co-extensional concepts with different intensions. As a classic example we
have that creature with a heart and creature with a kidney (which obviously
have different intensions) have the same extension since every living creature
2The difference between the two ways of talking follows from two closely related tradi-
tions. The first is based on Frege’s work and the latter on Rudolf Carnap’s work, as we
shall see in the following chapter.
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with a heart has a kidney and every living creature with a kidney has a heart.3
In an extensional formalization, concepts are identified with their exten-
sion such that whenever two concepts have the same extension then they are
identified (and hence substitutable). In an intensional formalization, con-
cepts are identified with their intension such that co-intensional concepts are
identified (substitutable). Because of the existence of different co-extensional
concepts, intensional formalizations of concepts provide a more adequate rep-
resentation of concepts than extensional formalizations.
This motivates why intensionality is important for conceptual knowledge
representation. It is important to mention that researchers in artificial intel-
ligence already in the 70s considered intensional formalizations of concepts to
be important [McCarthy, 1977; 1979; Woods, 1975; 1991; Brachman, 1979].
In this thesis, we will, after having defined intensionality formally, inves-
tigate the current formalizations of concepts. We will show that these are
extensional. There is, in other words, a need for intensional formalizations
of concepts and accordingly a need for intensional logics for representing and
reasoning with concepts.
The second major aim of the present work is therefore to present an inten-
sional concept logic. The aim will be fulfilled by the introduction of an inten-
sional concept logic in Chapter 5. The logic will be based on the assumption
that conceptual knowledge can be divided in two parts, an extensional part
and an intensional part, such that we have a part expressing relations between
extensions and a part expressing relations between intensions. For the exten-
sional part we simply adopt the description logicALC [Baader and Nutt, 2003;
Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka, 1991]. ALC stands out as the prominent exam-
ple of a logic for formalization of concepts. The syntax of the intensional
part is similar to the extensional part except that an intensional equivalence
relation = is used instead of the extensional equivalence relation ≡ of ALC.
Thus the logic comprises two kinds of identities, meaning we can distinguish
the role (modality) of a concept definition like
bachelor = unmarried man, (1.1)
3It has been debated whether one should consider the actual extension or all possible
individuals. If one does the latter, creature with a heart and creature with a kidney differ,
since there could be a creature with a heart and no kidney. But although this is acceptable
from a philosophical point of view (actually, many feel that it is not), it does not mean that
it is always useful in knowledge representation, for in knowledge representation one often
considers restricted domains of entities where it is useful (and maybe even imperative) to
express that concepts are co-extensional, although the possibility that they are not co-
extensional exists.
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which defines bachelor to be unmarried man, from contingent statements like
bachelor ≡ lonely hearted, (1.2)
which asserts that bachelors are the lonely hearted, and
creature with a heart ≡ creature with a kidney,
which asserts that every creature with a heart also has a kidney and con-
versely. Notice how (1.1) uses the intensional relation =, whereas the others
use the extensional.4
After defining the logic, we verify that it really is intensional. Moreover,
we will show some applications and argue that the advantages of using an
intensional concept logic are greater than one may expect at first. To show
the versatility of the intensional logic, we will now briefly describe an appli-
cation. Imagine a computer based system in which users are allowed to input
facts and rules to an already existing and acknowledged knowledge base and
database. One would then like to distinguish the user input like (1.2) from the
acknowledged data and knowledge like (1.1), while at the same time having
all the facilities for representing and reasoning with concepts as one usually
has. Since we are able to ascribe different roles to the two kinds of identities
(≡ and =), we can accomplish this, but we can actually accomplish much
more.
Based on the principle from philosophy of language that intensional knowl-
edge implies extensional, the acknowledged data and knowledge will “propa-
gate” to the users (so a user will be able to learn (1.1)), but not the other way
around.5 This means that the original data and knowledge base is protected
from inconsistencies and malicious users, although one is able to make fully
use of the user contributions. Suppose a user adds
bachelor ≡ not lonely hearted,
asserting that bachelors are not the lonely hearted. Then, this (together with
(1.2)) causes the extensional part (the user defined part) to be inconsistent,
since statements cannot both be true and false at the same time. But this
will not affect the acknowledged data and knowledge. In other words, the
4To keep things simple, we have not used the correct syntax of the intensional concept
logic.
5The relation between the extensional and intensional identities means that the system
works as a unified knowledge base and not merely as two separate knowledge bases.
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intensional concept logic can be used for uniting different types of knowledge,
and yet keep them discernible.6
The intensional semantics of the logic will be algebraically defined; it is
inspired by the property theory of George Bealer [Bealer, 1982; Bealer and
Mo¨nnich, 1989], however, despite the technical details of the semantics, our
intensional concept logic should be (almost) as easy to use as ALC, in that it
in some sense basically is an intensional description logic.
1.1 Overview of the Thesis
Our work is a cross disciplinary exercise in knowledge representation (the
main field of the thesis) and philosophy of language. However, since we put
an effort in keeping the disciplines apart, the thesis consists of two parts. The
first part, which is constituted by the chapters 2 and 3, investigates the issue
of intensionality. Addressed to everyone interested in logic in general and the
more technical aspects of philosophy of language in particular, this part may
be read independently of the rest. The second part, which is constituted by
the chapters 4 and 5, presents the intensional concept logic. A more detailed
overview:
Chapter 2 describes and comments on contributions to the understanding of
intensionality. The works of Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, and Alonzo
Church are presented and discussed. Although these authors are fa-
mous, we put forward important aspects which we believe have not
received the recognition they deserve.
Chapter 3 investigates more precisely the issue of intensionality. We present
a formal condition for determining whether a logic is intensional or ex-
tensional, and apply this to well-known logics and a well-known formal-
ization of concepts.
Chapter 4 concerns current formalizations of concepts. We describe the de-
scription logic ALC, argue that the prevalent formalizations of concepts
are not intensional and thereby reveal the need for intensional concept
logic.
Chapter 5 defines an intensional logic for formalization of conceptual knowl-
edge. It starts by clarifying our notion of a concept. It is stressed that
concepts are intensional. The logic is based on the description logic
6The example is more detailed described in Chapter 5.
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ALC, however, it consists of an intensional part which enables inten-
sional formalization of conceptual knowledge. The intensional seman-
tics will be algebraically defined. We show different versions of the logic,
and at the end, examples of applications are shown.
Appendix A The underlying approach of the intensional semantics may be
generalized to other kinds of logics. The appendix shows a propositional
logic based on the intensional semantics.
With the exception of Section 2.3 about Church’s contribution (where
some acquaintance with the λ-calculus is needed), the prerequisites for Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3 should be covered by acquaintance with classical and
modal logic. In Chapter 5 some acquaintance with universal algebra is needed.
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Chapter 2
Contributions to Intensionality
This chapter describes and comments on important contributions to the sub-
ject of intensionality. The works of Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, and Alonzo
Church will be presented in the following sections. We put forward impor-
tant aspects of these contributions which we believe have not received the
recognition they deserve.
2.1 Frege on Sense and Denotation
The subject of this section is Frege’s 1892 article “U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung”
[1984]. The article, which we consider to be the most important contribution
to intensionality, establishes the foundation for research in intensionality. The
article shows that in order to understand a language it is not enough to know
the denotations of its expressions—one must also know the so-called senses.1
Frege starts by investigating equalities, that is, expressions of the form
a = b, where a and b are names.2 After contemplating, he rightfully recognizes
1Frege, who wrote in German, used ’Sinn’ for ’sense’ and ’Bedeutung’ for ’denotation’.
There are different translations of this paper, some use ’reference’ or ’meaning’ instead of
’denotation’, however, we choose to follow the terminology used by Russell and Church.
2Note, equalities do not only occur in logical languages, in natural language, in which
the below arguments fit more naturally, an equality could be formulated as: a is identical to
b, or simply: a is b. Note also that ’name’ is used generally as an expression which denotes
some object.
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that an equality like a = b is true if a and b denote (refer to) the same.
Therefore,
the morning star is the evening star
is true because both morning star and evening star denote the planet Venus.
However, this is not all what Frege has to say about equalities. Consider
the two equalities a = a and a = b and assume both are true, i.e. that a and
b are names of the same. Frege recognized that the sentences differ, for the
former is trivially (analytically) true, whereas the latter is not. Frege says that
they differ with respect to their cognitive value. In a criminal investigation,
for example, a discovery like the suspect is the burglar is important, whereas
the suspect is the suspect simply is useless as it contains no cognitive value
(information).
As another example, consider the true sentence
the ancients believed that the morning star is the morning star, (2.1)
and the false sentence
the ancients believed that the morning star is the evening star. (2.2)
Although all subexpressions of both sentences have the same denotations, the
sentences are obviously different since one is true and the other is false.
Now, we may ask, why do the sentences differ? Frege answers: “A dif-
ference can arise only if the difference between the signs [expressions] corre-
sponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the things designated
[denoted].” In other words, morning star and evening star differ because the
ways in which they present their denotation differ. The way morning star de-
notes Venus may be formulated as: the brightest star or planet in the morning
sky. Similarly, the way evening star denotes Venus may be formulated as: the
brightest star or planet in the evening sky. Hence, morning star and evening
star have different modes of presentation, and this explains the difference
between the utterances above.
Frege then concludes p. 26–27 (we use the page numbering of the original
1892 paper):
It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign
(name, combination of words, written mark), besides that which
the sign designates [denotes], which may be called the meaning
[denotation] of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense
of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained.
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In other words, the sense of an expression contains its mode of presenta-
tion. In terms of the above examples, it should be clear that morning star
and evening star have different senses, and similarly for suspect and burglar.
Moreover, it is the difference between the senses which is the cause of the
difference between the cognitive values (information contents).
As another example, assume we have three lines a, b, c intersecting each
other in the point p. Then the phrases the intersection of a and b and the
intersection of a and c have the same denotation (namely p), but clearly
different senses.
Frege does not describe more precisely how senses are defined, but he
states some additional facts about senses. Senses are grasped “by everybody
who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to
which it belongs”. Moreover, on p. 27 he says:
The regular connection between a sign, its sense, and what it
means [denotes] is of such a kind that to the sign there corre-
sponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite thing meant
[denoted], while to a given thing meant [denoted] (an object) there
does not belong only a single sign. The same sense has different
expressions in different languages or even in the same language.
There may be expressions which have no denotation. Frege mentions the
examples the celestial body most distant from the earth and the least rapidly
convergent series. Moreover, we say that an expression expresses its sense and
denotes its denotation (the translation [Frege, 1984] uses ’designate’ instead
of ’denote’). Note that Frege accepts that exceptions to the regularities occur,
especially in connection with natural language.
In order to make these characterizations more clear, we (not Frege) have
made the following figure which illustrates the relations between an expres-
sion, its sense and what it denotes:
sense
determines
+1
0/1GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
G
◦
expression
denotes
+1 0/1
expresses
+0
1 wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
denotation
The lines indicate the relations between the expression, its sense and what
it denotes. The numbers indicate cardinality constraints. Starting with the
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denotes relation, the leftmost number +1 states that for each denotation
(denoted object) there are one or more expressions which are names for it.
The 0/1 states that each expression either denotes a single object or does
not denote. Notice that these constraints imply that there may be different
names for a given object, and that every expression is a name of at most one
object. The 1 at the expresses relation indicates that each expression has
one (its definite) sense. The +0 states that for every sense there exist zero
or more expressions that express it. We are not sure whether this constraint
should be +1 instead.
There is an additional constraint which says that the figure commutes.
This is indicated by the ◦. Commutativity says that the object denoted by
expression is the same as that which its sense determines. Frege does not say
this explicitly, however, it has to be an implicit assumption. Otherwise, the
sense would not be the mode of presentation, since what the sense determines
is then not the same as what the expression denotes, nor can there be a regular
connection between an expression, its sense, and what it denotes. Commu-
tativity will later play a significant role in our formalization of intensionality.
Note, Frege did not introduce a name for the determines relation. Moreover,
note that the constraints imply that sense uniquely determines denotation,
but not conversely (for a denotation may have several senses that determine
it).
It is important to note that Frege distinguishes senses from ideas (subjec-
tive thoughts). Ideas are more finely individuated than senses which are more
finely individuated than denotations, such that one may have different ideas
of the same sense. Senses lie therefore in between ideas and objects (denota-
tions). (Note that Frege wasn’t really interested in the role of the subjective,
instead he focused on senses which are objective.)
Frege made other important contributions in the 1892 paper, like putting
forward that the denotation of a sentence is its truth-value (this was later
revised by Richard Montague) and the sense is the thought it expresses. How-
ever, it falls out of scope to go into further details with these issues.
In addition to proposing senses, Frege’s paper is seminal because it reveals
a more technical aspect of senses which, together with Carnap’s contributions,
leads us to propose a formal definition of intensionality in Chapter 3. Based
on Leibniz’s famous “identity of indiscernibles” principle, in terms of which
that which may be substituted (replaced with each other) under preservation
of truth are identified, Frege investigates when expressions may be substi-
tuted for each other. He assumes that the meaning of a sentence remains
unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression with the
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same meaning (this is his famous compositionality principle). But he dis-
covers that the denotation of a sentence need not remain unchanged when
subexpressions with the same denotation are substituted for each other. (2.1)
and (2.2) show an example: declarative sentences with different truth-values
cannot have the same denotation, and since the truth-value of (2.1) changes
under the substitution of morning star with the co-denotational evening star,
the denotations of (2.1) and (2.2) cannot be the same.
Now we turn to an important aspect of the issue of sense and denotation.
Frege says (p. 28): “If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends
to speak of is what they mean [denote]. It can also happen, however, that
one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense.” This can be
explained by an example. In the sentence
the morning star is Venus (2.3)
we speak of the denotation of morning star, but in (2.2) we do not speak of
the denotation of morning star, because otherwise (2.2) would be no different
from (2.1). Instead we speak about the sense of morning star, such that (2.2)
asserts that the ancients believed that the brightest star or planet they could
see in the morning is the same as the brightest star or planet they could see
in the evening.
Frege then distinguishes the customary denotation of an expression, which
is its denotation, from the indirect denotation which is its sense. A context,
like (2.2) in contrast to (2.3), in which a name does not have its customary
denotation is called an indirect context or an oblique context. Quotations
and propositional attitudes (which involve assertions about beliefs, desires,
intentions, etc.) create oblique contexts. Oblique contexts have been studied
intensively, and Willard V. Quine has put forward a related contribution
[1943], which appears to be independent of Frege’s work as noted by Church
in a review of this paper.
Now, an interesting question arises, if the denotation of an expression in
an indirect context is its ordinary sense, then what is its sense in an indirect
context? In other words, what is its indirect sense? Does it have an indirect
sense at all? About this Frege says p. 37:
The case of an abstract noun clause, introduced by ’that,’ includes
the case of indirect quotation, in which we have seen the words to
have their indirect meaning [denotation], coincident with what is
customarily their sense. So here, the subordinate clause has for
its meaning [denotation] a thought, not a truth-value and for its
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sense not a thought, but the sense of the words ’the thought that
(etc.)’, which is only a part of the thought in the entire complex
sentence.
What Frege actually means has been debated, cf. [Carnap, 1956; Lewy, 1949].
The translation of Max Black [Frege, 1984] has a comment after ’abstract’:
“Frege probably means clauses grammatically replaceable by an abstract
noun-phrase: e.g. ’Smith denies that dragons exist’=’Smith denies the ex-
istence of dragons’.” We think, similar to [Lewy, 1949], that Frege means
that the sense of an expression e in oblique contexts (which includes ’that’
clauses) simply is the sense of ’the sense of ’e”. The sense of ’e’ denotes that
which is the sense of e, let us call it s, and therefore an expression the sense
of ’the sense of ’e” denotes the sense of s, that is, the sense of the sense of e.
In other words, we conclude that the oblique sense of an expression e is the
sense of the sense of e.
We will make this more clear by the following example. Consider two non-
identical expressions a and b with the same sense.3 Once we admit existence
of senses, we can construct the following true equalities
the sense of ’a’ = the sense of ’a’
and
the sense of ’a’ = the sense of ’b’.
Similar to the difference between a = a and a = b, which motivated the
introduction of senses, there is a difference between the two equalities in that
the former is vacuously true, whereas the latter, which may contain useful
information, is not.
Now, the question arises, how can they be different? The difference cannot
be due to senses, because the senses of a and b by assumption are equal. And
we have already explained that whenever a and b have the same sense, then
they also have the same denotation. Hence the difference cannot be due to
a difference between the denotations of a and b. The only alternative left is
simply to repeat Frege’s argument. The difference must be due to a difference
between the mode of presentation (i.e. the sense) of the sense of ’a’ and the
sense of ’b’. And since the sense of ’a’ denotes the sense of a, the difference
3Frege does not give any examples of names with the same sense, nor does he, as Carnap
and Church acknowledge, presents a more precise identity condition for senses. It appears
as if conditions of different strengths can be formulated, and accordingly we will later talk
about different conceptions of intensionality. As an example of two expressions which we
can say have the same sense, consider P or Q and Q or P.
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must be due to a difference between the sense of the sense of a and the sense
of the sense of b. Instead of saying “sense of the sense”, we will simply say
“sense sense”.
In other words, once we accept existence of senses we must also accept
existence of sense senses. And once we acknowledge sense senses, it should
be clear that we can repeat the construction above, and thereby show that
we must also acknowledge senses of sense senses, and so on. There is in other
words an infinite hierarchy of senses. It should also be clear that each level is
regularly connected to its lower level, just as senses are regularly connected
denotations.
Hence the relation between an expression, its denotation, its sense and
sense sense, etc. can be illustrated as follows
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where we have subscripted the names of relations to and from sense sense;
the . . . indicate that the figure continues infinitely.
The above presentation of sense senses is not Frege’s (it is our own). It is
not clear to what extend Frege realized this (and although it appears as if he
realized it, he did not state it). As far as we have been able to establish, Alonzo
Church was the first to clearly explain the inevitability of a hierarchy of senses,
see [1951] footnote 13. In the following when we refer to this notion of senses
(i.e. that we have an infinite hierarchy of senses), we will accordingly call it
the Frege-Church conception. Among the many authors who have written
about senses, few mention a hierarchy of senses. Nonetheless, it should be
clear that a formalization of senses is not fully adequate unless there is an
infinite hierarchy of senses.
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2.2 Carnap on Extension and Intension
This section presents and discusses Rudolf Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity
[1956]. We will not address the issues about modal logic for which this book is
widely known for and which have been discussed elsewhere, instead we focus
on the issue of intensionality.
In most of his definitions Carnap uses a (non-modal) first-order logical
language S1 similar to first-order predicate logic (S1 is, amongst other things,
distinguished from first-order predicate logic by having only a finite number of
predicate letters). Carnap does not restrict his investigations to S1, however,
for language systems in general he does not state explicit definitions but rather
informal conventions.
The definition of a true S1 sentence follows the traditional model-theoretic
definition with the important exception that the truth-value of an atomic sen-
tence is based on informal ’rules of designation’ (1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6).4 The rules
of designation formulate the truth-value by means of descriptions in the met-
alanguage such that a predicate letter followed by an individual constant is
true if the individual to which the constant actually refers possesses the prop-
erty to which the predicate actually refers. This generalizes to n-ary relations.
This is probably more easy to understand by means of some examples. The
following are of rules of designations (1-2):
’H(x)’ is a symbolic translation of ’x is human (a human being)’,
’RA(x)’ is a symbolic translation of ’x is a rational animal’,
’F (x)’ is a symbolic translation of ’x is (naturally) featherless’,
’B(x)’ is a symbolic translation of ’x is a biped’.
Two sentences φ and ψ are equivalent if φ↔ ψ is true (definition 1-8). As an
example, Carnap says that (∀x)H(x)↔ F (x) ∧B(x) is true, because we can
empirically verify that every human being is a (naturally) featherless biped
and conversely.
A class of sentences in S1 which contains for every atomic sentence either
this sentence or its negation and no other sentences is called a state-description
(p. 9). Carnap then introduces the notion of L-truth. A sentence is L-true if
it is true in every state description (definition 2-2).5 Moreover, two sentences
4The numbers represent the numbering used in Meaning and Necessity.
5L-truth is related to validity. Let φ be a sentence of first-order predicate logic. If φ is
logically valid (by the traditional model-theoretic definition) then φ is L-true. We do not
have the converse, as we shall see shortly.
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φ, ψ are L-equivalent if φ↔ ψ is L-true (definition 3-5b). Since “The English
words [of the rules of designation] here used are supposed to be understood in
such a way that ’human being’ and ’rational animal’ mean the same” (p. 4),
we get that (∀x)H(x) ↔ RA(x) is L-true. In a general semantical system a
sentence is L-true if its truth can be established on the basis of the semantical
rules alone (convention 2-1).
Designators are “those expressions to which a semantical analysis of mean-
ing is applied” (p. 6); for S1 these are thus sentences, predicate letters, func-
tion letters, and individual expressions. Two designators have the same ex-
tension if they are equivalent (definition 2-1). Note, Carnap generalizes equiv-
alence to all designators, for example, two constants a and b are equivalent
if a = b is true. Two designators have the same intension if they are L-
equivalent (definition 5-2). So all L-true sentences have the same intension.
For example, H and F ∧ B have the same extension, while H and RA have
the same intension. These definitions are generalized to any language by the
conventions 4-12 and 4-13. As L-truth obviously implies truth we can say
that intension determines extension.
Carnap says that the extension of a predicate letter is the corresponding
class (4-14), and the intension of a predicate letter is the corresponding prop-
erty (4-15). So the intension of H is by means of the rules of designation seen
to be the property of being human. It is important to note that he presup-
poses that a property is distinct from its corresponding class, and moreover,
that ’property’ is to be understood in a very wide sense, including whatever
can be said meaningfully about any individual. Relation is used in a similar
way to property, except that relations are n-ary. Concept is used as a common
term for properties and relations, and includes individual concepts (concepts
with only a single member). Later Carnap shows that identity of properties
may be formalized as necessary equivalence (something he has often been
cited for). It is argued that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value (6-1)
and its intension is the proposition expressed by it (6-2).
Now we turn to Carnap’s important definitions of extensionality and in-
tensionality. Since these, for some reason, are unnecessarily complicated, we
will present them more clearly. Let χ be a sentence, and let φ and ψ be
designators, moreover, let χ[ψ/φ] be the result of replacing an occurrence of
φ with ψ in χ (if φ does not occur in χ, it simply denotes χ). Then φ is
interchangeable with ψ if for every χ, χ is equivalent to χ[ψ/φ]. And φ is
L-interchangeable with ψ if for every χ, χ is L-equivalent to χ[ψ/φ] (11-1).
Now, a semantical system is extensional if for every φ, φ is interchangeable
with any expression equivalent to φ (11-2). And a system is intensional if it is
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not extensional and for every φ, φ is L-interchangeable with any expression L-
equivalent to φ (11-3). Interchangeablity has also been called substitutability
or substitutivity.
Carnap also introduces the notion of intensional isomorphism which com-
prises “ultra-intensional” entities (using Quine’s terminology). Two atomic
sentences are intensional isomorphic if they are L-equivalent, and two non-
atomic sentences are intensional isomorphic if their syntax trees have the
same structure (are isomorphic) and all their leaves are pair-wise intensional
isomorphic.6 So H ∧ ¬H and H ∧ ¬RA are intensional isomorphic, whereas
H and H ∨ H are not. Carnap suggests that intensional isomorphisms are
used for analysis of belief sentences. These have proven to be difficult to
analyse because one may have different beliefs about expressions that are co-
intensional. For example, N believes that P may be true while N believes that
Q is false although P and Q are co-intensional. Carnap then believes this
can be explained by means of intensional isomorphisms, such that the above
situation occurs only when P and Q are not intensionally isomorphic.7
Now we will comment upon Meaning and Necessity. We will discuss the
relation between Frege’s and Carnap’s contributions. First of all, semantics
has undergone significant changes since Meaning and Necessity was written.
For instance, empirical investigations or extra-linguistic knowledge are not
part of formal semantics today.8 In the light of this, some parts of Meaning
and Necessity are more of historical interest. Nevertheless, Meaning and
Necessity makes important contributions to (amongst other things) Frege’s
notion of sense by making it more precise.
Carnap’s semantical analysis of language systems is called the method of
extension and intension. The method is based on the distinction between
understanding the meaning of an expression (this is explicated by means of
intension) and investigating whether it holds in some context (this is expli-
cated by means of extension). The method is intended to be a “suitable
method for the semantical analysis of meaning” (p. 2).
The method of extension and intension is closely related to Frege’s notions
of denotation and sense, however, Carnap’s method is distinguished by the
6As before, we have presented a more simple definition instead of Carnap’s more com-
prehensive definition. Note, this definition is not fully precise for we have not defined when
variables are intensional isomorphic (because Carnap does not define this either).
7We do not find this fully satisfying, for among other things intensional isomorphisms
do not allow us to discern between co-intensional atomic formulas.
8Today’s prominent formal semantical theories are truth-conditional, meaning that the
semantics of an utterance is the conditions under which it is true. This means amongst
other things that the dubious rules of designations can be dispensed.
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fact that extension and intension remain the same in all contexts, in contrast
to Frege’s suggestion where they change in oblique contexts. This is actually
clearly stated in [Carnap, 1956], for example on page 125: “For any expression,
its ordinary nominatum [denotation] (in Frege’s method) is the same as its
extension (in our method).” Moreover, on page 126: “For any expression,
its ordinary sense (in Frege’s method) is the same as its intension (in our
method).” In other words, extension is the same as denotation in ordinary
contexts and intension is the same as sense in ordinary contexts. Moreover,
sense sense (oblique sense) and sense sense sense (oblique sense sense) etc.
seem to be the same as intension, because the oblique intension simply is the
intension.
It is interesting to elaborate on this. First of all, Carnap is often said
to adopt a possible-world semantics of concepts (such that the intension of
a concept is formalized as a mapping from possible worlds to extensions).
However, the close similarity between intensions and Frege’s more general
senses, suggests that Carnap’s notion of a concept is more general than that
of the possible-world semantics.
Second, and more importantly, we have argued that Frege’s notion of
sense leads to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Now, Carnap claims that his
two notions of extension and intension are suitable, that is, that the infinity
can be avoided. How can that be?
First of all, we can repeat the arguments which show the need for an
infinite hierarchy of senses in Carnap’s method. Consider two expressions A
and B which are assumed to be co-intensional, and the sentences:
A has same intension as A,
and
A has same intension as B.
Since the former, in contrast to the latter, is vacuously true, the two state-
ments differ. But why do they differ? It cannot be due to difference of
intensions because A and B are assumed to have the same intension, nor can
it be due to a difference of extensions—sameness of intension implies sameness
of extension. Since we accept the need for introducing intensions, we must
therefore also accept the need for introducing intensions of intensions.
One may argue that Carnap is saved by the fact that his notions of inten-
sion and extension belong to the metalanguage, and only expressions of the
object-language are subjects to the semantical analysis. However, assuming
the method of extension and intension is generally applicable, this argument
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does not hold—the method ought to work even in cases where the metalan-
guage is studied, and Carnap actually does consider the metalanguage by
means of a meta-metalanguage. Moreover, we could construct the example in
the object language simply by comparing the sentences A is A with A is B.
As we see the issue, it appears that Carnap fails to understand the full con-
sequences of Frege’s contribution. When discussing why Frege distinguishes
the oblique sense (sense sense) from the sense, Carnap says on p. 129: ”It is
not easy to say what his [Frege’s] reasons were for regarding them as different
[...] It does not appear, at least not to me, that it would be unnatural or
implausible to ascribe its ordinary sense to a name in an oblique context.”
It should additionally be noted that a reviewer of Meaning and Necessity, C.
Lewy [1949], says that Carnap has failed to understand Frege’s sense senses.
Basically, this shows that the method of extension and intension fails as a
suitable method for semantical analysis of meaning in general. Carnap may
to some extend actually have agreed about this, because—as already noted—
he introduces the notion of intensional isomorphism in addition to extension
and intension for analyzing the intricate belief sentences. Unfortunately Car-
nap does not compare intensional isomorphisms with higher level senses, but
there could be a rather close relationship, which suggests that the differences
between Frege’s work and Carnap’s work may be small indeed.
This does nevertheless not mean that the method of extension and in-
tension is useless, it merely shows that the method has some shortcomings.
Later we will adopt the method, and it will prove to be useful for concept
logics, since it is customary to divide the semantical analysis of concepts in
two parts.
2.3 Church’s Logic of Sense and Denotation
Alonzo Church made diverse contributions to the issue of intensionality. As
noted by Carnap [1956], he was responsible for the renewed interest in Frege’s
work about sense and denotation in the symbolic logic community. Moreover,
he clearly stated (as mentioned earlier) the inevitability of an infinite hierarchy
of senses. Additionally, he proposed his own formalization of Frege’s notion of
sense. In this section we present only an overview of this contribution, which
Church called A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation.
It is not trivial to make an unified presentation of this contribution, for
Church made five papers [Church, 1946; 1951; 1973; 1974; 1993] over a period
of almost 50 years, and in the process he presented different alternatives, and
made major revisions as previous formulations were unsound and faulty. We
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will simply refer to the unified presentation as the Formulation below.9 It
should be noted that, as far as we are aware, these particular contributions
of Church have not received much attention.
The Formulation is based on the typed λ-calculus, or more precisely on
Church’s own A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types [1940], which we
assume the reader is familiar with. Besides a few exceptions, which should be
obvious, we follow Church’s notation.
The most important notion in the Formulation is that of being ’a concept
of’. It is introduced as follows (p. 11 [Church, 1951]):
In order to describe what the members of each type are to be, it
will be convenient to introduce the term concept in a sense which
is entirely different from that of Frege’s Begriff, but which corre-
sponds approximately to the use of the word by Russell and others
in the phrase “class concept” and rather closely to the recent use
of the word by Carnap, in Meaning and Necessity. Namely any-
thing which is capable of being the sense of a name of x is called
a concept of x.
In terms of Frege’s work, we can say that if there exists a name which has the
sense y and denotes x, then Church says that y is a concept of x. However,
this does not mean that if y is a concept of x then there necessarily exists
a name which has y as sense and denotes x, because there may be more
concepts (namely uncountably many) than names, Church says. Note that the
Formulation is not aimed at presenting a Fregean semantics which describes
how to determine the meaning of sentences by means of Frege’s notions of
sense and denotation. The Formulation is a logic (or a foundation, we can
say) for intensional entities.
Church presented three alternatives for identifying senses, called Alter-
native (0), Alternative (1), and Alternative (2). Alternative (0) corresponds
to Carnap’s notion of intensional structure, such that senses roughly speak-
ing are identified if they are intensionally isomorphic. He explains the other
alternative as (the 1993 paper p. 141): “Under Alternative (1) we identify
propositions with Frege’s Gedanken, i.e., concepts of truth-values, and the
proposal is that propositions in this sense shall be taken as objects of asser-
tion of belief.” Under Alternative (2) the sense of the names A and B are
identified if and only if the equation A = B is logically valid. The last alter-
native turns out to be very similar to the Montague-Gallin logic (see [Gallin,
1975]) as noted by C. A. Anderson [1984].
9Note, when Church refers to the Formulation he speaks of his 1951 paper.
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As noted in [Anderson, 1984] Alternative (0) is suitable for constructing
a general intensional logic. In the following we therefore concentrate on this
alternative only. Our aim is not to present the entire Alternative (0), we
merely want to show the underlying ideas behind it as well as its relation to
the rest of this thesis.
We have the following simple types: o0, o1, o2, . . . and ι0, ι1, ι2, . . . (o0 and
ι0 are written as o and ι). The type o is to consist of truth-values (true
and false), and ι is to consist of individuals.10 Greek letters α, β, γ are used
as variables whose values are type symbols. The type αn+1 is to consist of
concepts of the members of type αn, thus o1 consists of concepts of truth-
values.
Among the primitive constants, ∆monαn+1αn plays an important role in the
Formulation.11 Below we will not use subscripts which can be derived from
the fact that the formulas are well-formed.
Now, ∆0oα1α denotes a binary function whose value (for a pair of argu-
ments) is truth in case the second argument is a concept of the first, and
otherwise false. The essential axioms of the Formulation allow proofs of the
form ∆MαMα1 , which expresses that Mα1 is a concept of Mα. We now present
the most relevant of these (they may be found in [Church, 1974]). First, we
have the axiom schema called (15mαβ):
(∀fαβ∀fα1β1∀xβ∀xβ1) ∆mfαβfα1β1 → (∆mxβxβ1 → ∆m(fαβxβ)(fα1β1xβ1))
which we interpret as: functional application preserves the concept-of relation.
Second, we have the axiom schema called (16mαβ):
(∀fαβ∀fα1β1∀xβ∀xβ1) (∆mxβxβ1 → ∆m(fαβxβ)(fα1β1xβ1))→ ∆mfαβf1α1β1
which basically is the converse of (15mαβ). Note that we, by increasing the
subscripts and superscript by 1 in the rightmost subformula, get the sense
f1α1β1 of fαβ .
Third, we have the axiom schema called (17mα):
(∀xα∀yα∀xα1) ∆mxαxα1 → (∆myαxα1 → xα = yα)
which asserts that a concept can at most be a concept of one thing.
10Note that we say ’is to’, Church presented namely no models of the Formulation in
general.
11The superscript m was added in the 1974 paper in order to avoid antinomies. Note, λ-
abstraction is also subscripted, i.e. λnxβnMαn is a well-formed formula of type αnβn (using
the typing convention of Simple Type Theory).
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If we compare the axioms with Frege’s contribution, we see that the last
axiom formalizes the relation between senses and what they determine (the
figure on page 25 shows this relation). Moreover, the two first axioms appear
not to be inconsistent with his work. It is not clear to us whether the re-
maining axioms of the Formulation (which we have not presented here) are in
accordance with Frege’s contribution, but Church admits in the 1951 paper
(page 4) that “we do make certain changes to which he [Frege] would probably
not agree.”
Later we present a completely different algebraic approach for formalizing
concepts. But it is interesting to note that there are similarities to Church’s
Formulation. First of all, we admit (in the logic of Section 5.4) an infinite
hierarchy of senses, just as Church does (this should be clear since there is no
limit on the subscripts o0, o1, o2, . . . ). Moreover, our functions on intensions
(senses) will preserve functional application, as we shall see later.
2.4 Other Contributions
Stacked on top of each other, the volume of the contributions of Frege, Carnap,
and Church take up only a fraction of the entire volume of the collection of
writings which in some way or another are related to the issue of intensionality.
We can divide these writings into two categories.
First of all there are the pre-symbolic-logic authors, like Antoine Arnauld
(Port-Royal logic), Immanuel Kant, Gottfried W. Leibnitz, and John S. Mill.
As it falls out of scope to address historical and general philosophical issues,
these will not be considered.
Secondly there are the recent (and formal contributions) like those of
Peter Aczel [1980], Jon Barwise and John Perry [1983], Paul Gilmore [2001],
Michael Jubien [1989], Yiannis Moschovakis [1994], and Edward Zalta [1988].
These contributions present very different theories, and it falls out of scope
to describe them in details, however, it should be noted that the issue of an
infinite hierarchy of senses does not seem to have been addressed in these
contributions.
There are also the contributions of Richard Montague [1974c; 1974b;
1974a]. As these, after some years, became widely renowned and have been
presented and discussed intensively elsewhere (see for example [Gallin, 1975;
Anderson, 1984; Gamut, 1991b]), we find no need for yet another presentation
of this work. Moreover, the intensional logic we present later (Chapter 5) is,
unlike Montague’s work, not based on possible-world semantics.
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Finally there are the contributions of George Bealer [Bealer, 1982; Bealer
and Mo¨nnich, 1989] and the related [Menzel, 1986; Swoyer, 1998]. They
present an approach which is closely related to our approach. These contri-
butions are described in Chapter 5, however, it should be noted that they do
not address the issue of the infinite hierarchy of senses either.
Chapter 3
Defining Intensionality
The aim of this chapter is to present a formal definition of intensionality
based on the contributions described in the previous chapter. The first section
discusses the intuitive notion of intensionality as a step towards the formal
definition which is presented in the second section and discussed in the third.
Thereafter we examine whether some well-known logics are extensional or
intensional. The fifth section describes how to determine whether a logical
theory is intensional. The last section presents a theory which at first may
appear to be intensional; then we show that the theory is extensional. This
motivates a formal definition of intensionality.
3.1 The Intuitive Notion of Intensionality
Before we present the formal definition of intensionality, it is important to
note that there is what we call an intuitive notion of intensionality in terms of
which a language is intensional if denotation is distinguished from sense, that
is, if both a denotation and a sense is ascribed to some of its expressions. This
notion is simply adopted from Frege’s contribution described in the previous
chapter.
The reason why we do not adopt the intuitive notion is that it is not
well established what the sense of an expression precisely is in general. Of
course, following Frege, we know that sense contains mode of presentation,
that sense determines denotation, and senses are grasped (see section 2.1).
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However, these conditions are not sufficient, it seems, for determining whether
something really is the sense of an expression.
Several suggestions on how to formalize senses (or intensions) have been
presented. A contribution by Moschovakis [1994] suggests that sense is algo-
rithm and denotation is the value of the algorithm. This seems to be coherent
with Frege’s work. However, there is a problem of formulating senses of senses,
but maybe they are some sort of higher-order algorithms that computes al-
gorithms.
The possible world semantics of modal logic provides another suggestion in
which intension arises through functional abstraction.1 For example, a propo-
sition in propositional logic is interpreted as a truth-value. Under the possible
world semantics (of propositional modal logic) it is interpreted as a mapping
from possible worlds (contexts) to truth-values. The extension of a proposi-
tion can accordingly be seen as its truth-value in the actual world and the in-
tension as the mapping from possible worlds to truth-values. This greatly en-
hances the expressivity, for example, distinct propositions may have the same
truth-values in some of the possible worlds, meaning we can discern between
co-extensional propositions. However, the formalization of propositional atti-
tudes is inadequate, because one may have different propositional attitudes to-
wards propositions which have the same truth-values in every possible world,
i.e. co-intensional propositions. This has been extensively discussed in the
literature, see for example [Anderson, 1984; Ba¨uerle and Cresswell, 1989;
Carnap, 1956]. Reinhard Muskens [1991] presents a possible solution to this
problem which is based on the possible world semantics, however, it assumes
that propositions are abstracted even further (as mappings of mappings and
so on).
It should be noted that the intensional semantics we present later proposes
another suggestion for formalizing senses.
The intuitive notion suggests a more technical condition for defining in-
tensionality. As noted by Frege and Carnap, expressions with the same de-
notation (extension) need not have the same sense (intension). This means,
as we saw in the previous chapter, that the truth-value of a sentence may be
altered if co-denotational expressions are substituted for each other. Hence
co-denotational expressions are not substitutable in general. It seems as if
1Often ’intension’ has been used exclusively in connection with possible world semantics,
however, we use (as many others) ’intension’ in a more wide sense as described in Chapter
2. ’Intensional logic’ has actually been used as a general term for modal logic, temporal
logic, and Montague’s IL [van Benthem, 1988; Gamut, 1991b], but we will later show that
other intensional logics exist.
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this only provides a necessary condition for being intensional in terms of the
intuitive notion, however, since it is not established what precisely senses
are, we will identify intensional languages with languages that do not allow
substitution of co-denotational formulas.
We therefore have the following characterization of intensionality:
a language is extensional if all co-denotational expressions can be
substituted for each other, and a language is intensional if it is
not extensional.
This is similar to (and adopted from) Carnap’s definitions of extensionality
and intensionality (see page 27), except that we identify intensional with non-
extensional (Carnap had additionally that co-intensional expressions must be
substitutable). This identification is similar to the general linguistic charac-
terization of intensionality used today, see e.g. [Audi, 1999]. Moreover, we use
’co-denotational’ instead of ’co-extensional’ as explained earlier. The charac-
terization is an important step towards the definition of intensionality. Since
the definition should be formal, we have restricted it to languages with a
formal notion of consequence, viz. logics.
There exists a vast amount of writings about intensionality and issues
related to intensionality, however, very few precisely define what it means
to be intensional. Carnap represents an exception, however, his definition
is not formal. In many cases, intensionality is associated with natural lan-
guage understanding, in particular, the feature of natural language that co-
denotational phrases cannot necessarily be substituted for each other. Note
that this use of intensionality is related to the intuitive notion of intension-
ality (our introduction of the intuitive notion was actually motivated by this
use of intensionality).
This vagueness is probably caused by the fact that intensionality is an
intricate notion. This has for example been acknowledged by R. H. Thomason.
He writes [1985] p. 2:
The point [. . . ] is that there’s really no such thing as a naive
theory or even a naive account of intensionality. This is a subject
for sophisticates, who have bought the program of giving a certain
type of semantic theory for a sufficiently rich language, and who
are concerned about the interpretations of phrases—in particular,
of sentences.
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3.2 The Definition of Intensionality
In his seminal paper where he defines a complete semantics of modal logic
S5, Kripke says [1959] p. 3:
It is noteworthy that the theorems of this paper can be formalized
in a metalanguage (such as Zermelo set theory) which is “exten-
sional,” both in the sense of possessing set-theoretic axioms of
extensionality and in the sense of postulating no sentential con-
nectives other than the truth-functions. Thus it is seen that at
least a certain non-trivial portion of the semantics of modality is
available to an extensionalist logician.
The quotation has inspired us to propose that intensionality should be stud-
ied in well-known and well accepted mathematical settings, i.e. in extensional
settings (if nothing else, this should at least show to what extend being in-
tensional can be made rigorous). The present work attempts to follow this
suggestion.
It is not trivial to define extensionality and intensionality formally (which
also suggests why it, to our knowledge, has not been done before). One prob-
lem is that we want the definition to work in general and not merely for
distinguishing between modal logic and classical logic. Another problem is
that the notions, like co-denotation, that are presupposed in the character-
ization are not precise in general. For example, what does it mean to be
co-denotational in FDE (first degree entailment)? And what does it mean to
be co-denotational in a description logic?2
The characterization of intensionality implicitly says: if co-denotational
then substitutable. Hence it comprises a conditional, but there are many ways
to formalize conditionals. In order to be general, we formalize it on the meta-
level by means of logical consequence (entailment). Moreover, there may be
several notions of logical consequence in a given logic.
It also turns out to be a problem that we want our definition to be in
accordance with the intensionality results which are part of the logical folklore
where modal logic is said to be intensional and first-order predicate logic
extensional.
Definition 1 Let φ, ψ and χ be formulas and Γ a set of formulas of the logic
in question. Let |= be the consequence relation, ↔ the biimplication and let
2This will be answered later.
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χ[ψ/φ] be the result of substituting (replacing) an occurrence of φ with ψ in
χ. Then the logic is extensional if
whenever Γ |= φ↔ ψ, then Γ |= χ implies Γ |= χ[ψ/φ]
for all φ, ψ, χ and Γ. The logic is intensional if it is not extensional.
It is important to note that the notions on which the definition is founded
need not be uniquely defined in general; we may for instance have several
definitions of logical consequence. In such cases we may have several inten-
sionality results.
The definition is in accordance with Carnap’s definition of extensionality
and intensionality, assuming that φ and ψ are co-extensional if φ ↔ ψ is
satisfied, which commonly is the case. Actually, Carnap reaches a result (thus
it is not a definition) which is quite similar to our definition of intensionality,
see [1956] 12-1. b. Moreover, the definition does also seem to be in accordance
with the intuitive notion of intensionality, as we will argue below. It should
also be noted that it is similar to the use of extensionality and intensionality
in [Gamut, 1991a; 1991b], although they do not define extensionality nor
intensionality.
3.3 Alternative Definitions
The above definition of extensionality and intensionality is only one of several
alternatives. Now we describe some of these.
In Definition 1 intensionality was defined by means of the meta-logical
notion of entailment. Alternatively it could be defined internally such that
the conditional used in the characterization of intensionality is formalized by
means of implication. Then the logic could be defined as extensional if
(φ↔ ψ)→ (χ→ χ[ψ/φ])
is valid for all formulas φ, ψ, χ.3 Such a definition has not been used because
description logics do not comprise a general implication within the logic, more-
over, this definition does not, informally speaking, allow us to discern between
different definitions of entailments (and as we shall see, different entailment
relations give rise to different intensionality results).
3Which implies (Γ → (φ ↔ ψ)) → ((Γ → χ) → (Γ → χ[ψ/φ])), an “internal” version of
Definition 1, assuming → is material implication; Γ is now a formula.
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Intensionality has been defined in terms of a biimplication connective.
However, we could also define it directly in terms of co-denotation. We can
accomplish this if the notions of satisfaction and model are well defined for
the particular logic in question. (This is inspired by Tarski’s contemplations
about the concept of logical consequence [1956].) Intensionality could then
be defined as follows.
Let φ, ψ, and χ be formulas and Γ a set of formulas (of the logic in
question). If in every model which satisfies Γ, the interpretation
of φ is equal to the interpretation of ψ, then we say that φ and
ψ are co-denotational in Γ. The logic is said to be extensional if
it satisfies the following: whenever φ and ψ are co-denotational
in Γ, then if χ is a logical consequence of Γ then χ[ψ/φ] is a
logical consequence of Γ, for all φ, ψ, χ and Γ. If the logic is not
extensional then we say that it is intensional.
This is in accordance with Carnap’s definition. However, we have not said
anything about when to identify models, and this may not be clear in general.
So far our investigations show that this definition gives the same intensionality
results as Definition 1.
As yet another alternative, one may found the definition of extensionality
on another (more meta-logical) understanding of co-denotation in which for-
mulas are co-denotational if they are consequences of each other. Then the
logic could be defined as extensional if
φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ implies χ |= χ[ψ/φ] (3.1)
for all φ, ψ, χ. However, under this definition modal logic becomes extensional,
so this definition is not coherent with the intuitive notion of intensionality.
After having defined extensionality and intensionality, we discovered that
D. M. Gabbay [1994] gives a general and formal definition of extensionality.
Let |∼ be the consequence relation of the logic in question (we use the notation
of [Gabbay, 1994]). Then a connective ](A1, . . . , An) is extensional if
xi |∼ yi, yi |∼ xi, i = 1 . . . n
](x1, . . . , xn) |∼ ](y1, . . . , yn)
Moreover, a logic is extensional if all its connectives are extensional in all their
variables. We get that Gabbay’s definition of extensionality is equivalent to
our definition of extensionality formulated in (3.1), since n applications of
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(3.1) give
x1 |= y1 y1 |= x1
](x1, x2, . . . , xn) |= ](y1, x2, . . . , xn)
...
xn |= yn yn |= xn
](x1, . . . , xn−1, xn) |= ](x1, . . . , xn−1, yn)
which give (assuming uniform substitution of multiple variables is sound)
xi |= yi, yi |= xi, i = 1 . . . n
](x1, . . . , xn) |= ](y1, . . . , yn)
This shows that our definition of extensionality subsumes Gabbay’s. The
converse is easy to see (by structural induction on χ), meaning that the two
definitions are equivalent.
Gabbay [1994] does not discuss other definitions of extensionality, nor does
he mention intensionality. Notwithstanding, it shows that different definitions
of extensionality have been described in the literature.
Notice how Gabbay’s definition of intensionality is similar to the compati-
bility property of a congruence relation.4 This suggests that there is a relation
between whether a logic is extensional and whether the consequence relation
gives rise to a congruence.
There is one problem, though, the consequence relation is not an equiv-
alence relation (in common cases, at least). Let us therefore define a binary
relation |∼| on the formulas by x |∼| y if and only if x |∼ y and y |∼ x. Clearly,
|∼| is symmetric, it is also reflexive, and it is transitive (assuming |∼ is tran-
sitive), because if x |∼| y and y |∼| z, then x |∼ y, y |∼ x, y |∼ z, and z |∼ y,
which give x |∼ z and z |∼ x, thus x |∼| z.
Then it should be clear from the above that the logic in question is exten-
sional by the definition formulated in (3.1) if and only if |∼| is a congruence,
that is, if and only if
x1 |∼| y1 · · · xn |∼| yn
](x1, . . . , xn) |∼| ](y1, . . . , yn)
It falls out of scope to pursue this relation further.
4Let A be an algebra and let θ be an equivalence relation on A. The compatibility
property holds for θ if x1θy1, . . . , xnθyn implies f(x1, . . . , xn)θf(y1, . . . , yn) for all n-ary
function symbols f and for all x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn ∈ A.
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3.4 Intensionality Results
The following lemma is used for simplifying the proof of extensionality of
propositional logic.
Lemma 2 For every set of formulas Γ and formulas φ, ψ and χ in proposi-
tional logic we have that
whenever Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ], then Γ |= χ implies Γ |= χ[ψ/φ]. (3.2)
Proof. In order to keep track of the different quantifications and implications,
we show this by encoding the result in first-order predicate logic. Γ |= φ is
defined as follows: if for every assignment α of truth values to the proposi-
tional letters, we have that if every member of Γ is true under α (in which
case we simply write t(α,Γ)), then φ is true under α (in which case we write
t(α, φ)). Thus, Γ |= φ if and only if ∀α(t(α,Γ) → t(α, φ)) (we have not de-
fined t(·, ·), but this is straightforward). In fact this is a misuse of notation,
strictly speaking the arguments of t are not formulas (or sets of formulas) of
propositional logic, but terms denoting formulas. An encoding of the formu-
las can be accomplished by means of Go¨del numbers. However, as this is not
important, we skip these technicalities.
Then we have the following encoding of (3.2)
∀α(t(α,Γ)→ t(α, χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]))→
(∀α(t(α,Γ)→ t(α, χ))→ ∀α(t(α,Γ)→ t(α, χ[ψ/φ])))
which gives, by the semantics of biimplication in propositional logic
∀α(t(α,Γ)→ (t(α, χ)↔ t(α, χ[ψ/φ])))→
(∀α(t(α,Γ)→ t(α, χ))→ ∀α(t(α,Γ)→ t(α, χ[ψ/φ]))).
This formula is valid, because it is implied by the universal generalization of
an instance of a tautology, (p→ (q ↔ r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r)). Hence the
encoding of (3.2) is valid, meaning that (3.2) holds. 
Theorem 3 Propositional logic is extensional.
Proof. Because of Lemma 2 it suffices to show
Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ].
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We proceed by induction on the structure of χ. Note, if φ does not occur in χ
then χ[ψ/φ] simply is χ, meaning we get Γ |= χ↔ χ, which obviously holds.
Moreover, if χ is identical to φ, then Γ |= χ ↔ χ[ψ/φ] becomes Γ |= φ ↔ ψ
which is the assumption. These two obvious cases will not be shown in the
following.
The base case when χ is a propositional letter p. If φ does not occur in p
then we get the abovementioned obvious case. Otherwise φ occurs in p, which
means that φ and p are identical; this leads as mentioned above also to an
obvious case.
For the case ¬χ′ the induction hypothesis, Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= χ′ ↔
χ′[ψ/φ], gives that χ′ and χ′[ψ/φ] have the same truth value under every
assignment which satisfies every member of Γ. But this means, by the truth
table for ¬, that ¬χ′ and ¬χ′[ψ/φ] have the same truth value under every
assignment which satisfies every member of Γ, hence Γ |= ¬χ′ ↔ ¬χ′[ψ/φ].
For the case χ1∧χ2, let us assume Γ |= φ↔ ψ. The induction hypotheses
Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= χi ↔ χi[ψ/φ], i = 1, 2, give that χi and χi[ψ/φ] have
the same truth value under every assignment which satisfies every member of
Γ. But this means, by the truth table for ∧, that χ1∧χ2 and χ1[ψ/φ]∧χ2[ψ/φ]
i.e. that χ1 ∧ χ2 and (χ1 ∧ χ2)[ψ/φ] have the same truth value under every
assignment which satisfies every member of Γ, hence Γ |= (χ1 ∧ χ2)↔ (χ1 ∧
χ2)[ψ/φ].
By the adequacy of the negation and conjunction connectives, the remain-
ing cases need not be shown. 
The result is as we would expect because all the connectives of proposi-
tional logic are truth-functions, so the truth-value of a connective depends
only of the truth-values of its arguments which means that formulas with the
same truth-value are substitutable.
One may think that our definition of extensionality is unnecessary com-
plicated and suggest that we simply define extensionality by Γ |= φ ↔
ψ implies Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]. This would then mean that we can skip Lemma
2. Unfortunately, this definition of extensionality is not sufficiently general:
substitutivity is assumed to hold if χ↔ χ[ψ/φ], but in general (as in Chapter
5) we may have several biimplications. And in such cases it is not enough
that substitutivity holds only for one of the biimplications. This explains our
more general definition of extensionality where the implication is formulated
in the metalanguage.
Now we turn to modal logic. There are two definitions of logical con-
sequence in modal logic, the local consequence relation and the global con-
sequence relation [Blackburn et al., 2001]. For a formula χ to be a local
44 Defining Intensionality
consequence of a set of formulas Γ, notation Γ |= χ, we must have that when-
ever all formulas of Γ are true in a possible world in a model then χ is true
in the same possible world in that model. For χ to be a global consequence of
Γ, notation Γ |=g χ, we must have that whenever Γ is true in every possible
world of a model then χ is true in every possible world of the model too.5
Lemma 4 For every set of formulas Γ and formulas φ, ψ and χ in the modal
logics K–S5 we have that
whenever Γ |=g χ↔ χ[ψ/φ], then Γ |=g χ implies Γ |=g χ[ψ/φ]. (3.3)
Proof. This is proven similarly to Lemma 2, but instead of quantifying over
assignments, we quantify over Kripke models and possible worlds. This makes
the proof more technical, but since it follows the same approach as the proof
of Lemma 2, it is not presented it here. 
Theorem 5 The modal logics K–S5 are
1. intensional with respect to the local consequence relation,
2. extensional with respect to the global consequence relation.
Proof. 1. We simply show a counter example for S5. Let p and q be propo-
sitional letters then
p↔ q |= p↔ q and p↔ q |= p↔ p,
but
p↔ q 6|= p↔ p[q/p].
To see this, let (W,R, V ) be a Kripke model with W = {w1, w2} and let
R = W ×W (which is an equivalence relation), and let V (p) = {w1, w2} and
V (q) = {w1}. We verify that (W,R, V ), w1  p ↔ q and (W,R, V ), w1 6
p↔ q.
5More precisely, a Kripke model is a tuple (W,R, V ) consisting of a set of possible worlds
W , a binary accessibility relation R on W and a valuation V mapping the propositional
letters to 2W . The local consequence relation |= is defined as follows: Γ |= φ if for every
Kripke model M = (W,R, V ) (of the appropriate class) and possible world w ∈ W , if
M,w  Γ then M,w  φ. Where  is the usual satisfaction relation in modal logic
(following the notation of [Blackburn et al., 2001]). The global consequence relation |=g is
defined as: Γ |=g φ if for all Kripke models M = (W,R, V ) (of the appropriate class), if for
all w ∈W , M,w  Γ then for all w ∈W , M,w  φ.
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For obtaining the results for the weaker modal logics note that φ |= ψ if
and only if φ→ ψ is valid under the usual possible world definition of validity.
Then, since every formula which is valid in one of the weaker logics is valid
in S5, and (p↔ q)→ (p↔ q) is not valid in S5, it cannot be valid in the
weaker modal logics, which therefore must be intensional too.
2. Because of Lemma 4, we merely have to show
Γ |=g φ↔ ψ implies Γ |=g χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]
for all φ, ψ, χ,Γ. We proceed by induction on the structure of χ. All cases
but necessitation are similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
For the case χ′, let us assume Γ |=g φ ↔ ψ. The induction hypothesis
Γ |=g φ ↔ ψ implies Γ |=g χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ] gives that for every Kripke model
(W,R, V ), which for every possible world satisfies every member of Γ, that
(W,R, V ), w  χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ] for all w ∈ W . Hence χ′ and χ′[ψ/φ] have the
same truth value in every possible world w of the model. But this means that
χ′ and χ′[ψ/φ] have the same truth-value in all possible worlds accessible
from w for all w ∈ W , hence, by the semantics of , (W,R, V ), w  χ′ ↔
χ′[ψ/φ] for all w ∈W , which shows the wanted Γ |=g χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ]. 
It should be noted that the local intensionality result generalizes to other
modal logics than the ones above, but not all. In principle it is possible for
a modal logic to be locally extensional, for instance, a normal modal logic
with the axiom p ↔ p is extensional.6 Such logics, however, seem to be
of little relevance—as modal logics at least. This, along with the fact that
the local consequence relation is the most common definition of consequence,
means that a general characterization of modal logic as being intensional is
acceptable.
The extensionality result for the global semantics of modal logic can fairly
easy be shown by means of the algebraic semantics of modal logic.7 One of
the advantages of the algebraic semantics is that once we have established
6A normal modal logic is a set of formulas containing the propositional tautologies, the
axiom K, (p → q) → (p → q), and which is closed under modus ponens, uniform
substitutions and generalization (if φ is a member then so is φ) [Blackburn et al., 2001].
7Now we briefly present the algebraic semantics of modal logic. This is described in
details in [Blackburn et al., 2001]. An interpretation is a homomorphism v˜ from the
formulas to an algebra with a greatest element 1 (a complex algebra). Now, Γ |= φ if
for all ω ∈ Γ, v˜(ω) = 1 implies v˜(φ) = 1. Then we have the extensionality result be-
cause if v˜(φ ↔ ψ) = 1, that is, if v˜(φ) = v˜(ψ), then v˜(χ) = v˜(χ[ψ/φ]). This can
be proven by induction on the structure of χ. For the case ♦χ′, we have for instance
v˜(♦χ′) = f♦(v˜(χ′)) = f♦(v˜(χ′[ψ/φ])) = v˜(♦χ′[ψ/φ]), where f♦ is the operator for ♦. The
remaining cases are similar.
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one extensionality proof, it is easy to see that logics which may be given a
similar semantics must be extensional too (we will use this later).
Now we turn to first-order predicate logic. Similar to modal logic, we may
present two notions of consequence. A local consequence defined as: Γ |= χ if
for every interpretation and valuation, whenever all formulas of Γ are satisfied
by the valuation in the interpretation then χ is satisfied by the valuation in
the interpretation. And a global consequence defined as: Γ |=g χ if for every
interpretation whenever every formula of Γ is satisfied by every valuation in
the interpretation then χ is satisfied by every valuation in the interpretation
(this is also known as semantical entailment). Moreover, we may say that
there are two versions of predicate logic: one in which open formulas are
allowed (meaning for example that p(x) ↔ p(x) is valid), and one in which
only sentences (closed formulas) are considered.
Lemma 6 For every set of formulas Γ and formulas φ, ψ and χ in first-order
predicate logic we have that
whenever Γ |=g χ↔ χ[ψ/φ], then Γ |=g χ implies Γ |=g χ[ψ/φ], and
whenever Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ], then Γ |= χ implies Γ |= χ[ψ/φ].
Proof. The proofs are similar to the proofs of the previous lemmas. 
Theorem 7 First-order predicate logic is
1. extensional with respect to the global consequence relation,
2. extensional with respect to the local consequence relation if only sen-
tences are considered,
3. intensional with respect to the local consequence relation.
Proof. 1. Because of Lemma 6 we only have to show (for all φ, ψ, χ,Γ)
Γ |=g φ↔ ψ implies Γ |=g χ↔ χ[ψ/φ].
The proof proceed by induction on the structure of χ, and all cases but
quantification are similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
For the case ∀xχ′, let us assume Γ |= φ ↔ ψ. Then the induction hy-
pothesis gives Γ |= χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ]. Thus every interpretation, which for every
valuation satisfies Γ, satisfies χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ] for every valuation, but then
the interpretation also satisfies ∀x(χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ]) for every valuation, by the
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semantics for quantification. This implies that the interpretation satisfies
∀xχ′ ↔ ∀xχ′[ψ/φ], hence Γ |= ∀xχ′ ↔ ∀xχ′[ψ/φ].
2. By Lemma 6 it suffices to show
Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]
for all sentences φ, ψ and χ and every set of sentences Γ. Notice that we now
consider closed formulas. Instead of the above we will show
Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= ∀x1 · · · ∀xn(χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]),
where we generalize χ to a formula, and {x1, . . . , xn} contains all the variables
occurring in χ. This is easily seen to imply the wanted by the axiom (∀xφ)→
φ and the fact that every sentence is a formula.
We proceed by induction on χ. For the case when χ is an atomic for-
mula χ′; if φ is identical to χ′ then we must show Γ |= ∀x1 · · · ∀xn(χ′ ↔ ψ).
This follows from the assumption Γ |= χ′ ↔ ψ which may be generalized
by x1, . . . , xn since neither χ′ nor ψ contain any free variable—they are by
assumption sentences. Otherwise, we get an obvious case (no substitution).
The case ∀yχ′. The induction hypothesis gives Γ |= ∀x1 · · · ∀xn(χ′ ↔
χ′[ψ/φ]). If y is a free variable of χ′ then there exists an integer i ≤ n such
that xi is identical to y since {x1, . . . , xn} contains the free variables of χ′.
Hence we have Γ |= ∀x1 · · · ∀xn∀y(χ′ ↔ χ′[ψ/φ]) which implies the wanted
Γ |= ∀x1 · · · ∀xn(∀y(χ′) ↔ ∀y(χ′[ψ/φ])). If y is not a free variable of χ′ then
the result is easily seen to hold.
The two remaining cases are similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
3. We show a counter example. We have
p(x)↔ q(x) |= p(x)↔ q(x) and p(x)↔ q(x) |= ∀x(p(x)↔ p(x))
but
p(x)↔ q(x) |= ∀x(p(x)↔ q(x))
does not hold. 
Although we, when formulating the semantics of predicate logic, allow
valid formulas to be open, it is more natural to consider formulas to be uni-
versally quantified at outermost level (corresponding to the first case above)
or to consider only closed formulas (corresponding to the second case above).
Thus a general characterization of predicate logic as being extensional is ac-
ceptable.
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Now we consider the three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz and FDE (first
degree entailment), see e.g. [Priest, 2001; Urquhart, 2001].8
Proposition 8 1. The three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz is extensional;
2. First degree entailment (FDE) is intensional.
Proof. 1. Similar to the earlier extensionality proofs, we establish that if
Γ |= φ↔ ψ implies Γ |= χ↔ χ[ψ/φ]
holds for every φ, ψ, χ,Γ then the logic is extensional. As this is proven similar
to the proof of Lemma 2, we will not show it.
Now we can prove that the three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz is extensional
by induction on χ. Although we have three truth values instead of two, the
proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. It will therefore not be shown
here. 
2. We present a counter example of extensionality. We have
p↔ q |= p↔ q and p↔ q |= (r ∧ p)↔ (r ∧ p)
but
p↔ q 6|= (r ∧ p)↔ (r ∧ q).
To see that the latter is the case, consider the interpretation i(p) = 1, i(q) = b,
and i(r) = n. We get i(p ↔ q) = b which is a designated truth-value, and
i((r ∧ p)↔ (r ∧ q)) = n which is not a designated truth-value. 
8Now we briefly describe the semantics of these two logics. The three-valued logic of
 Lukasiewicz has three truth-values: 1, 1
2
and 0. The truth-tables for the connectives are
¬
1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
∨ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
0 1 1
2
0
∧ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1
2
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
0 0 0 0
→ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1
2
0
1
2
1 1 1
2
0 1 1 1
↔ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1
2
0
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
0 0 1
2
1
FDE has four truth-values 1, b, n, 0. The truth-tables are
¬
1 0
b b
n n
0 1
∨ 1 b n 0
1 1 1 1 1
b 1 b 1 b
n 1 1 n n
0 1 b n 0
∧ 1 b n 0
1 1 b n 0
b b b 0 0
n n 0 n 0
0 0 0 0 0
↔ 1 b n 0
1 1 b n 0
b b b 1 b
n n 1 n n
0 0 b n 1
Under valid inferences all so-called designated truth-values are preserved. So let D be a
set of designated truth-values which is a subset of the truth-values, then φ |= ψ if for every
interpretation i, i(φ) ∈ D implies i(ψ) ∈ D. For the three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz
D = {1} and for FDE D = {1, b}.
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Both the three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz and FDE are non-classical log-
ics. The proposition shows therefore that extensional logic is not the same as
classical logic and that intensional logic is not the same as non-classical logic.
Now we comment on the results. The extensionality and intensionality
results appear to be in accordance with the intuitive notion of intensional-
ity. If we, for example, consider the local semantics of modal logic (where
the consequence relation is |=), it appears to be intensional in terms of the
intuitive intensionality notion because of the distinction between denotation
(extension) in the actual world and the denotation (intension) in all possible
worlds. However, under the global semantics of modal logic (where the con-
sequence relation is |=g), this distinction vanishes on the level of entailment,
since every formula of the antecedent must be satisfied in every possible world
and not merely in the actual. Thus, in terms of the intuitive notion, the global
semantics is not intensional.
The results are also in correspondence with what seems to be common
knowledge in the logic community, with the exceptions that we say that
modal logic is extensional under the global consequence relation and that
predicate logic is intensional under the local consequence relation, in contrast
to the general agreement that modal logic is intensional and predicate logic
is extensional. One may therefore complain that this means that there must
be something wrong with our definition of extensionality and intensionality.
However, we find the results satisfying, because once we accept that modal
logic is intensional, then first-order predicate logic must at least in some sense
be intensional too, because of the well-known result of modal logic which says
that modal formulas are equivalent to first-order formulas in one free variable
[Blackburn et al., 2001]. This also explains the similarities between the proofs
of Theorem 5 and 7. The proofs of Theorem 5 and 7 show actually that the
intensionality property of modal logic can be seen as stemming from lack of
quantification of open formulas.
In the proof of intensionality of FDE (Proposition 8), the denotation of p
and q are actually not the same. One may therefore argue that the example
does not show non-extensionality because co-denotation is not presupposed.
However, p and q are both interpreted as designated truth-values, hence in
terms of the consequence relation of FDE (where we have two designated
truth-values) they are equivalent, and accordingly we can consider them—
at least in some sense—to denote the same. (Note that modal logic has a
similar “problem” with respect to the local semantics where p ↔ q means
same denotation in the actual possible world.)
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We find that this discussion justifies our definition of intensionality. More-
over, the discussion shows that intensionality is a comprehensive notion of
which there does not seem to be a universal definition, but a plethora of
candidates of which we have surveyed only a few.
3.5 Intensional Properties of Logical Theories
Our investigations of intensionality have been restricted to the level of for-
mulas (to the level of the logical connectives), however, for logics which syn-
tactically admit individuals, like first-order predicate logic, we additionally
have intensionality properties for this level. Note that we have an intension-
ality property for the logical axioms of the logic in question, and intensionality
properties for the particular theories formulated in the logic. Now we consider
whether theories formulated in the logic are intensional.
Consider, for example, axiomatic set-theory. It is said to be extensional—
not because it is formulated in an extensional logic—but because of its ex-
tensionality axiom (or extensionality principle, depending on the particular
theory). This suggests that a set-theory without the extensionality axiom is
non-extensional (intensional).
We will not go into details with this aspect, but it should be clear that
the definition of intensionality (Definition 1) can be altered to handle this
kind of intensionality. This can be illustrated by an example. Consider a
theory of names which is formulated in first-order predicate logic. We have a
binary predicate co-den expressing that two names are co-denotational. Now,
assume we have the axiom
∀x∀y(x = y → co-den(x, y))
which says that identical names have the same denotation. If the converse
does not hold, it should be clear that the theory is intensional because co-
denotational names are not necessarily identical, meaning that co-denotatio-
nal names cannot be substituted.
3.6 Reduction to Extensionality
A common principle of intensionality states that the intension of a concept is
the set of properties common to all the individuals falling under the concept.
In this section we show that if we follow this principle, concepts with the
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same extension are identified. In other words, this principle reduces to an
extensional formalization of concepts.
We start by formalizing the principle. We have a set of individuals, a set
of properties, and a set of concepts (properties are distinguished from con-
cepts). Individuals are said to posses properties, meaning there is a binary
relation A between individuals and properties. We write A(x, p) when indi-
vidual x is ascribed property p (such a relation is often called an instance
relation). Individuals fall under (are members of) concepts, meaning there is
a binary relation E between individuals and concepts. We write E(x, c) when
individual x falls under concept c. Concepts have intensions which are sets
of properties, so we have a binary relation between properties and concepts.
We write I(p, c) when p belongs to the intension of c, in which case we say p
is a mark of c. The idea of this principle is that the extension of a concept
is formalized as the set of all individuals falling under the concept and the
intension is formalized as the set of all its marks.
Concepts are identified with their intension. This means, among other
things, that we are able to define when concepts subsume each other. We say
that c is a subconcept of d if the intension of d is a subset of the intension of
c (note the ordering).
An individual x falls under a concept c if and only if x is ascribed all the
marks of c, thus
∀x∀c(∀p(I(p, c)→ A(x, p))↔ E(x, c)). (3.4)
Moreover, p is a mark of c if and only if all the individuals falling under c are
ascribed p, thus
∀p∀c(∀x(E(x, c)→ A(x, p))↔ I(p, c)). (3.5)
Notice the close relationship between (3.4) and (3.5). (It is actually this
duality which is responsible for the extensionality property of the theory.)
Now, assume we have two co-extensional concepts d and d′, that is,
{x | E(x, d)} = {x | E(x, d′)}
then (3.5) yield
∀p(∀x(E(x, d)→ A(x, p))↔ I(p, d))
and
∀p(∀x(E(x, d′)→ A(x, p))↔ I(p, d′)),
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which by the assumption ∀x(E(x, d)↔ E(x, d′)) give
∀p(I(p, d)↔ I(p, d′)).
In other words, {p | I(p, d)} = {p | I(p, d′)}, meaning that d and d′ are
co-intensional. Thus, co-extensionality implies co-intensionality. As concepts
are identified with their intension, this shows that co-extensional concepts are
identified, meaning that the principle reduces to extensionality. This is not
the first principle which turns out to reduce to extensionality. Church admits
in [1973] that parts of his earlier formulation [1951] reduces to extensionality.
By weakening the assumption that the intension is the set of properties
common to all the individuals of the extension of the concept, that is, by
replacing (3.5) with
∀p∀c (∀x E(x, c)→ A(x, p))← I(p, c), (3.6)
the principle does not reduce to extensionality. Note that this means that
the intension of a concept is a subset of the set of properties common to all
individuals of the extension of the concept, because (3.6) yields
{p | I(p, c)} ⊆ {p | ∀x(E(x, c)→ A(x, p))}.
The problem with this solution is that there is no sufficient condition for
identifying concepts, that is, we have no sufficient condition for I(p, c).
The above theory is closely related to formal concept analysis [Ganter
and Wille, 1999], although they present their theory differently. The revised
theory comprising (3.6) instead of (3.5) is closely related to the notion of
semiconcept in formal concept analysis.
Now we turn to a different but related issue, namely that of Galois con-
nections.9 Above we saw an example of an instance relation A between in-
dividuals and the properties ascribed to them. It is noteworthy that such a
relation gives rise to a Galois connection. This fact is well-known (see e.g.
[Ganter and Wille, 1999]), but we will show it anyway because it proves the
existence of an inverse relation between extension and intension, which have
been acknowledged for a long time in the philosophical literature, see e.g. [Ar-
9A Galois connection is a pair of mappings (f : P → Q, g : Q→ P ) between the partial
orders (≤, P ) and (≤, Q) which are dually adjoint, that is, such that p ≤ g(q) if and only
if q ≤ f(p) holds for all p ∈ P and q ∈ Q. In a Galois connection we have p ≤ p′ implies
f(p′) ≤ f(p), and q ≤ q′ implies g(q′) ≤ g(q).
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nauld and Nicole, 1996] (first edition published in 1662) and [Weingartner,
1974].10 Moreover, we do not show the same as [Ganter and Wille, 1999].
Given an instance relation A ⊆ I × P , define the mapping i : 2I → 2P by
and e : 2P → 2I by
i(X) = {y ∈ P | ∀x ∈ X A(x, y)},
and define e : 2P → 2I by
e(Y ) = {x ∈ I | ∀y ∈ Y A(x, y)}.
We can think of i as some kind of intension mapping in the sense that it gives
the properties common to all the individuals, and e as some kind of extension
mapping in the sense that it gives the individuals to which all the properties
are ascribed.
We have, then, for a subset of individuals X ⊆ I and a subset of properties
Y ⊆ P that
X ⊆ e(Y ) if and only if Y ⊆ i(X),
because
∀x(x ∈ X → x ∈ {x ∈ I | ∀y ∈ Y A(x, y)}) ⇔
∀x(x ∈ X → ∀y ∈ Y A(x, y)) ⇔
∀x∀y(x ∈ X → (y ∈ Y → A(x, y))) ⇔
∀x∀y(y ∈ Y → (x ∈ X → A(x, y))) ⇔
∀y(y ∈ Y → ∀x ∈ X A(x, y)) ⇔
∀y(y ∈ Y → y ∈ {y ∈ P | ∀x ∈ X A(x, y))}.
Hence (i, e) is a Galois connection, meaning that i and e are order reversing,
so if X ⊆ X ′ then i(X ′) ⊆ i(X) and if Y ⊆ Y ′ then e(Y ′) ⊆ e(Y ). This shows
(among other things) the inverse relation between extension and intension.
Note, the terminology and principles introduced in this section, Section
3.6, will not be used in the remainder. Note also that the terminology ’inten-
sion’ is actually a bit misleading since the principle reduces to extensionality.
10The “inverse relation between extension and intension” means merely that if one general-
izes a concept (i.e. decreases the intension) then one increases the extension, and conversely.
For example the extension of dog is less than the extension of animal, but the intension of
dog is larger (comprises more marks like domesticated) than the intension of animal.
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Chapter 4
Current Concept Logic
This chapter describes the approaches currently used for formalization of con-
ceptual knowledge. First we describe the background of these approaches,
then description logics will be presented, after which we examine whether
description logics are intensional. Finally we examine other concept theories.
4.1 Background
Description logics stem from semantic networks which form a large group of
graphical languages and systems used mainly in the 1970s to represent and
reason with conceptual knowledge. The following figure illustrates a simple
semantic network
hoinjmkl
telephonehoinjmkl
OO
color;;vvvvvvvvvv
telephone
black
blackPWQVRUST//
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in which the concept black telephone is a subconcept of telephone and has an
attribute color with the value black.
The problem with semantic networks was that they did not have a rig-
orously defined semantics. Commenting upon the situation before semantic
networks were formalized, Brachman and Levesque state in [1985] p. 217:
Until this time, the semantics of semantic network languages were
mostly a mystery, with the meanings of various constructs relying
strictly on the intuitions of the reader and based normally only on
suggestive naming conventions.
The semantic network above could for example stand for a concept definition
such that black telephone is defined as telephone with color black, however, it
could also assert a relation between the concept telephone and the color black
such that every (or some) telephone is assumed to have the color black, cf.
[Woods, 1975]. The figure in isolation is not enough to disambiguate.
The lack of formal semantics of semantic networks was firstly criticized by
William Woods [1975].1 (Woods’ paper was actually predated by a contribu-
tion of Patrick Hayes [1974], but Hayes’ paper does not seem to be as widely
recognized.) After this, different versions of description logics with formal
semantics appeared (but it was not until recently that they were known as
’description logics’—at one time they were actually known as ’concept log-
ics’). One of the most important papers was [Levesque and Brachman, 1987]
which investigates the trade-off between computational complexity and ex-
pressiveness, something which has turned out to be one of the major research
themes of description logics. With the introduction of ALC [Schmidt-Schauß
and Smolka, 1991] description logics reached their current form. During this
period the notion of a concept changed from a data-structure intended to
represent human memories to the formal notion used today which is defined
in the following section.
4.2 Description Logics
Stemming from semantic networks, description logics are tailored for repre-
senting and reasoning with conceptual knowledge. As many description logics
1The paper by Woods [1975], which is often referred to as a ’milestone’ in the history of
semantic networks, is particular interesting for us, because this paper, as well as his later
papers, like [Woods, 1991], stresses the importance of intensionality in connection with
semantic networks.
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have nice computational properties (compared to other logics), they provide a
means for representing and reasoning with conceptual knowledge in practice.
We focus on the prototypical description logic ALC [Baader and Nutt,
2003; Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka, 1991]. Since the majority of description
logics are more expressive (or eventually less expressive) versions of ALC and
have a model-theoretic semantics similar to ALC, it suffices (for our purpose)
to consider ALC. We attempt to use the same notation as the Description
Logic Handbook [Baader et al., 2003].2
Description logics have a rather special variable-free syntax (such that
is it possible for non-logicians to use them), which makes them similar to
equational logics. The terms of ALC are called concept descriptions; they are
defined by means of a set C of atomic concepts and a set R of atomic roles.
Atomic roles are used for expressing binary relations between concepts.
For the remainder of this chapter let c and d be any concept descriptions
and r any atomic role.
The set of concept descriptions are formed by means of the following syntax
rule (a more logical definition is presented in Definition 10):
c, d→ a | (atomic concept)
> | (universal concept)
¬c | (concept negation)
c u d | (concept conjunction)
∀r.c (value restriction).
Moreover, we have the following abbreviations:
⊥ stands for ¬> (bottom concept)
c unionsq d stands for ¬(¬c u ¬d) (concept disjunction)
∃r.c stands for ¬(∀r.(¬c)) (existential quantification).
Note that these are similar to the classical abbreviations.
ALC is given a model-theoretic semantics. An interpretation (·)I consists
of a mapping C → 2U where U is a non-empty set called the domain of
the interpretation, and a mapping R → 2U×U . It extends to a mapping on
2Among other things, we do not write concept descriptions in capital letters, and we give
entailments a unified presentation, linking together TBoxes and ABoxes.
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concept descriptions by the following definition:
>I = U
(c u d)I = cI ∩ dI
(¬c)I = {(cI) = U\(cI)
(∀r.c)I = {x ∈ U | ∀y(〈x, y〉 ∈ rI → y ∈ cI)}.
We can verify that the abbreviations have a straightforward semantics:
(c unionsq d)I = (¬(¬c u ¬d))I = {({cI ∩ {dI) = cI ∪ dI
⊥I = (¬>)I = ∅.
Similarly, it can easily be shown that
(∃r.c)I = {x ∈ U | ∃y(〈x, y〉 ∈ rI ∧ y ∈ cI)}.
In description logics, formulas are separated into two components, TBoxes
and ABoxes. TBoxes formulate the relations between concepts and ABoxes
formulate membership relations between individuals and concepts on one
hand and individuals and roles on the other. Thus when we want to state
that the concept bachelor is a subconcept of man then the assertion belongs
to a TBox, and when we want to say that John is a particular bachelor, the
assertion belongs to an ABox.
This separation means that there are two kinds of formulas. The former
kind are called terminological axioms (in accordance with the name TBox).
There are two types of terminological axioms:
c ≡ d,
which expresses that c is equivalent to d, and
c v d,
which expresses that c is subsumed by d, i.e. that c is a subconcept of d. The
subsumption relation is also known as the is-a relation.
Now, a TBox is simply a set of terminological axioms. Note, sometimes it
is in addition required that a TBox has a particular simple structure.
The semantics of TBoxes is as follows. Let (·)I be an interpretation and
T a TBox. Then (·)I satisfies c ≡ d if cI = dI , and (·)I satisfies c v d if
cI ⊆ dI . Moreover, (·)I satisfies T if (·)I satisfies all terminological axioms
of T ; such an interpretation is called a model of T .
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In order to describe ABoxes, we need individuals.3 Let a and b be any
individuals. There are two types of formulas in ABoxes:
c(a) and r(a, b),
called a concept assertion and a role assertion. Now, an ABox is simply a set
of concept assertions and role assertions.
The semantics of ABoxes follows the semantics of TBoxes, however, the
interpretation now also maps individuals to members of the domain of the
interpretation. Let (·)I be an interpretation andA an ABox, then (·)I satisfies
c(a) if aI ∈ cI , and (·)I satisfies r(a, b) if 〈aI , bI〉 ∈ rI . Moreover, (·)I satisfies
A if (·)I satisfies all concept and role assertions of A; such an interpretation
is called a model of A.
Now we present some examples.
string-instrument ≡ instrument u ∃has-part.string
expresses that a string instrument is an instrument which has a part which
is a string (and conversely that an instrument which has a part which is a
string is a string instrument). And
guitar v string-instrument
expresses that every guitar is a string instrument, i.e. that guitar is a subcon-
cept of string-instrument.
Moreover,
odd-number ≡ natural-number u ∀has-divisor.odd-number
expresses that an odd number is a natural number such that all its divisors are
odd numbers (and conversely). (We have treated natural numbers as concepts,
but they could also be individuals.) Notice that this axiom is recursive.4
3Similar to [Baader and Nutt, 2003] we do not introduce a set of individuals.
4There is an easy way to read concept descriptions if you are a logician. An atomic
concept stands for a unary predicate and a concept description stands for a formula of first-
order predicate logic in one free variable. The above examples translate to the formulas:
∀x(string-instrument(x) ↔ instrument(x) ∧ ∃y(has-part(x, y) ∧ string(y)))
∀x(guitar(x) → string-instrument(x))
∀x(odd-number(x) ↔ natural-number(x) ∧ ∀y(has-divisor(x, y) → odd-number(y))).
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Moreover,
guitarist(John)
expresses that the individual named John falls under the concept guitarist ,
i.e. that a John is a guitarist.
We are now ready to present the important definition of entailment (logical
consequence) which formalizes what knowledge we can infer from TBoxes and
ABoxes.
Let T be a TBox and A an ABox. If every model of T ∪A satisfies c ≡ d
(or c v d), we say that T ∪ A entails c ≡ d (or c v d) and write
T ∪ A |=ALC c ≡ d (or T ∪ A |=ALC c v d).
If every model of T ∪ A satisfies c(a) (or r(a, b)), we say that T ∪ A entails
c(a) (or r(a, b)) and write
T ∪ A |=ALC c(a) (or T ∪ A |=ALC r(a, b)).
Notice that this means that ALC is a fragment of first-order predicate logic,
since everything that one can express in ALC can be expressed in first-order
predicate logic (see also footnote 4).
Now we have for example
|=ALC >(a) and 6|=ALC ⊥(a)
for every individual a.
There are other description logics than ALC. The expressiveness of ALC
can for example be enhanced by adding role constructions to the language
(such that we not only have primitive roles but also role descriptions). Role
conjunction r1 u r2 is defined as
(r1 u r2)I = rI1 ∩ rI2 .
Role complement ¬r is defined as
(¬r)I = U × U\(rI).
Then we have for example
6|=ALC (r u ¬r)(a, b) and |=ALC ∀(r u ¬r).c ≡ >
for every (a, b) and every c.
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There are many aspects of description logics which we have not consid-
ered here (because they are not important for the present work). We have
for example not considered how to construct algorithms that can perform de-
ductions, nor have we considered complexity issues (entailment deduction of
terminological axioms in ALC is ExpTime complete [Donini, 2003]).5
4.3 Extensionality Results
Theorem 9 The description logic ALC is extensional.
Proof. Let c, d, e, f be concept description, T a set of terminological axioms,
concept assertions and role assertions, and let (e ≡ f)[d/c] be the result of
substituting an occurrence of c with d in e ≡ f . Then we have to show, for
all c, d, e, f, T :6
whenever T |=ALC c ≡ d, then T |=ALC e ≡ f implies T |=ALC (e ≡ f)[d/c].
We proceed by induction on the structure of e. Note, we actually have two
cases, one for e and one for f , but as these are similar, we only show the
former. Note, if c does not occur in e then e[d/c] simply is e, meaning we
get T |=ALC e ≡ f , which is the assumption. Moreover, if c is identical to e,
then T |=ALC (e ≡ f)[d/c] becomes T |=ALC d ≡ f which follows from the
assumption T |=ALC c ≡ d and T |=ALC c ≡ f . These two obvious cases will
not be shown in the following.
The base case when e is a primitive concept. If c does not occur in e
then we get the abovementioned obvious case. Otherwise c occurs in e, which
means that c and e are identical; this leads as mentioned above also to an
obvious case.
For the case ¬e′, assume T |=ALC c ≡ d. Then the induction hypothesis
gives that T |=ALC e′ ≡ f implies T |=ALC e′[d/c] ≡ f for any f , that is, for
every model (·)I of T , (e′)I = (e′[d/c])I . Thus, if we assume T |=ALC ¬e′ ≡ f ,
that is, if we for every model (·)I of T assume that fI = (¬e′)I = {(e′)I ,
then we get fI = {(e′[d/c])I = (¬e′[d/c])I . Hence T |=ALC ¬e′[d/c] ≡ f .
For the case e1 u e2, assume T |=ALC c ≡ d and T |=ALC e1 u e2 ≡ f .
Then we get, for every model (·)I of T , (e1 u e2)I = eI1 ∩ eI2 = (e1[d/c])I ∩
5ExpTime may sound frightening to some, however, there do exist implemented de-
scription logic systems which can deal with large ontologies (more than 100.000 concept
introduction axioms) [Haarslev and Mo¨ller, 2001].
6We also have to show extensionality for the cases when e ≡ f is a concept or role
assertion, but as these are easily seen to hold, they will not be shown.
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(e2[d/c])I = ((e1 u e2)[d/c])I , where the second equality follows from the
induction hypotheses. Hence T |=ALC (e1 u e2)[d/c] ≡ f .
For the case ∀r.e′, assume T |=ALC c ≡ d and T |=ALC ∀r.e′ ≡ f . Then we
get, for every model (·)I of T , (∀r.e′)I = {x | ∀y 〈x, y〉 ∈ rI → y ∈ (e′)I} =
{x | ∀y〈x, y〉 ∈ rI → y ∈ (e′[d/c])I} = (∀r.e′[d/c])I , where the second equality
follows from the induction hypothesis. Hence T |=ALC ∀r.e′[d/c] ≡ f . 
Extensionality results can be shown for description logics similar to ALC.
Some authors characterize TBoxes as ’intensional’ [Nardi and Brachman,
2003; Calvanese et al., 1998]. In terms of the contributions described in
Chapter 2, it should be clear that this is not correct.
There is a close relation between modal logics and description logics. Klaus
Schild [1991] has shown this. The relationship is so close that ALC is said
to be “a notational variant of modal logic Km”.7 We will show the close
relationship by showing how ALC formulas are translated to equivalent Km
formulas. The motivation for showing this is that the relation between Km
and ALC is important for our intensionality results.
Let us without loss of generality consider the atomic concepts to be propo-
sitional variables and the modalities to be indexed by the set of primitive roles
R. Then we can translate a concept description c into a Km formula c′ by:
(c u d)′ = c′ ∧ d′
(¬c)′ = ¬c′
(∀r.c)′ = rc′
We can also translate ALC interpretations to Kripke models. This can be
done as follows. Let (·)I : C → 2U and (·)I : R → 2U×U be an ALC
interpretation (recall, interpretations consist of two mappings although we
often identify them with their first component). Then the associated Kripke
model is (U, (rI)r∈R, (·)I : C → 2U ). Thus an individual of U is considered
to be a possible world, the accessibility relations become the interpretations
of the roles, and the valuation becomes the interpretation of concepts. It is
easy to see that both of these translations are bijective.
Let c ∈ TC be a concept description. It maps by the above translation to
a Km formula φ. And let (·)I : C → 2U be an ALC interpretation. Then we
have the equivalence between satisfaction in ALC and in Km, for every i:
i ∈ cI if and only if (U, (rI)r∈R, (·)I), i  φ.
7Modal logic Km is simply a modal logic with m pairs of modalities each axiomatized
as modal logic K, that is, i(φ→ ψ) → (iφ→ iψ). Thus K1 is simply modal logic K.
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This is proven by induction on c, consider the case ∀r.d which translates to
rψ. We have
i ∈ (∀r.d)I ⇔ ∀y ∈ U(〈i, y〉 ∈ rI → y ∈ dI)
by the definition of satisfaction in ALC. This translates to the equivalent
(U, (rI)r∈R, (·)I), i  rψ ⇔ ∀y ∈ U(〈i, y〉 ∈ rI → (U, (rI)r∈R, (·)I), y  ψ)
by the Kripke semantics for necessity. This shows that ALC concept descrip-
tions and Km formulas are notational variants. (But it does, strictly speaking,
not show that ALC and Km are notational variants.)
Now the interesting question arises, how we can say that ALC is exten-
sional (Theorem 9) when modal logic is intensional (Theorem 5), and ALC
and modal logic are so closely related? The answer is that there is only
a global definition of logical entailment in description logics (although one
could define a local one, it does not appear to be useful, nor has it been done,
as far as we are aware). The extensionality result of ALC is simply another
formulation of the extensionality result for the global entailment relation for
modal logic (Theorem 5 item 2). Note that this contributes to the under-
standing of the relation between modal logic and description logic. Usually
one has only considered the relation between concept descriptions of ALC and
Km formulas, but there is also a relation with respect to entailment, in which
case modal logic in some sense is richer than description logics, as it has more
notions of logical consequence.
4.4 Concept Theories
Description logics do not provide the only means for representing and rea-
soning with concepts. Among the many alternatives, first-order predicate
logic and in a few cases some first-order modal logic have been used, see e.g.
[McCarthy, 1979; Welty and Guarino, 2001; Paloma¨ki, 1994].
The straightforward way to formalize a concept c in first-order logic is
to represent it as unary predicates pc such that pc(t) if and only if the
individual t falls under c. This provides an intuitive as well as expres-
sive formalization, which for example is used in [Welty and Guarino, 2001;
Hayes, 1979]. The subconcept relation is simply formalized by means of im-
plication. For example, ∀x(guitar(x) → string-instrument(x)) asserts that
guitar is a subconcept of string-instrument. Moreover, guitarist(John) ex-
presses that John is a guitarist. Every TBox and ABox can be represented
under this approach, which therefore is more expressive than ALC.
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Because first-order predicate logic is extensional, such formalizations are
unfortunately extensional (but if one uses first-order modal logic, such formal-
izations may be intensional). Note that many of the logics we meet in artifi-
cial intelligence, like the knowledge interchange format (KIF) [Genesereth and
Fikes, 1992; Genesereth, 1991] and conceptual graphs [Sowa, 2000] have the
same semantics as first-order predicate logic. Hence similar concept theories
formulated in these languages are extensional too.
It should now be clear that the prevalent formalizations of concepts are
extensional.
Alternatively, more general kinds of concept theories have been put for-
ward. McCarthy suggests in [1977; 1979] that concepts should be represented
as objects, i.e. as constants and variables, in first-order predicate logic (note
that McCarthy only considers individual concepts, that is, concepts with a
single member). Subsumption could then be formalized by means of a binary
predicate is-a, meaning that the above example becomes
is-a(guitar , string-instrument).
For distinguishing between whether a constant is a concept or an individual
we could use predicates, and to express that John is a guitarist, we could use
an instance relation. Such theories may be intensional. However, because of
the poor computational properties of predicate logic, such theories are more
useful for illustrating particular aspects of concepts, for example, showing
modal aspects of concepts like [McCarthy, 1979], rather than formulating
particular ontologies. Moreover, it is also a problem that these formulations
often do not provide a condition for identifying concepts; they simply remove
the extensional condition that concepts with the same members are identified
and present no alternative.
Finally, it should be noted that there (of course) are other notions of
concepts and accordingly completely different concept theories. Formal con-
cept analysis [Ganter and Wille, 1999] presents an interesting theory which
as shown in Section 3.6 allows both extensional and intensional concept for-
malization (or mathematization as it is called). However, because of its nice
mathematical properties, there are far more results for the extensional formal-
ization. As this theory has arisen from a different tradition (lattice theory)
than ours (symbolic logic), and is founded on a different setting (so-called
formal contexts) than ours, it will take us too far afield to go into details
about this (see also Section 3.6).
Peter Ga¨rdenfors has proposed a concept theory [2000] based on a geomet-
rical notion of conceptual structures. Prototype theory, see e.g. [Hampton,
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1993], presents another principle where a concept is defined by its prototypi-
cal members, that is, the members which exemplify the concept particularly
well. This means that an individual is a member of a concept up to a certain
degree, instead of being either a member or not (as we assume). It should be
noted that the two latter proposals are informal.
The above investigations show that the currently used approaches do not
provide a viable means for formalization of conceptual knowledge. This will
be remedied below when we present a decidable, intensional concept logic.
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Chapter 5
Intensional Concept Logic
This chapter concerns the intensional concept logic. After a motivation, the
second section provides a formal definition of the logic. The following three
sections present different kinds of variants of the logic, and finally different
applications are described.
5.1 Motivation
We follow, as noted earlier, the tradition in knowledge representation and
artificial intelligence. This does unfortunately not mean that it is precisely
established what concepts are. On the contrary—most authors presuppose the
notion of a concept, although one has not been precisely established (maybe
because it appears intuitive what concepts are). Nevertheless, we will briefly
touch upon this subject, because it is important for how concepts should be
represented.
Our notion of a concept is similar to Carnap’s in the sense that our con-
cepts are names for what Carnap calls concepts, with the exception that
we consider concepts to be unary—roles capture the binary case.1 This no-
tion of a concept seems to be in accordance with the tradition in knowledge
representation, in particular the more philosophically rooted tradition fol-
lowed by people like John McCarthy [1977; 1979] and William Woods [1991;
1It would probably be more appropriate if we called concepts for concept names but this
is not common in knowledge representation.
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1975].2
The set of members of a concept is called its extension. Concepts are
not necessarily defined by their extension, meaning that distinct concepts
with the same extension exist. In the introduction we mentioned the con-
cepts creature with a heart and creature with a kidney as examples of distinct
co-extensional concepts. As another often used example we have mermaid
and unicorn which have no members (or at least no actual members), and
therefore are vacuously co-extensional. Moreover, naturally featherless biped,
rational animal, and human constitute another example. And equilateral tri-
angle and equiangular triangle constitute an infamous and debatable example.
These examples may appear somewhat speculative. In practice, where one
often considers a restricted application domain and not all (possible) states
of our universe, there are many other relevant cases in which we would like
to assert co-extensionality although co-extensionality may be falsified in gen-
eral. When modeling hospitals, for example, we may assert that operation
is a surgical procedure, i.e. that operation and operation u surgical procedure
are co-extensional, and that every patient (and only patients) has a medical
record, i.e. that patient and ∃has.medical-record are co-extensional.3
In other words, concepts are non-extensional (intensional). This is in
accordance with many papers in knowledge representation and artificial in-
telligence, cf. [McCarthy, 1977; 1979; Woods, 1975; 1991; Brachman, 1979;
Nilsson and Paloma¨ki, 1998; Boman et al., 1997].4
Now, an important question arises, if the extension does not define a con-
cept, then what does? The contributions described in Chapter 2, provide an
answer, and following Carnap, we say that the intension defines a concept
such that concepts with the same intension are identified. Note that we use
’intension’ more generally than the possible-world tradition. This answer is
not without problems, for as already noted there does not seem to be a gen-
2Concepts should not be confused with ideas or thoughts. Concepts are related to ideas
and thoughts as described in Section 2.1, however, concepts are linguistic entities of formal
languages and not mental entities. This should also explain why we talk about the intension
of a concept and compare it to senses. Recall, senses are associated with names, and the
difference between senses and intensions is that, whereas we have senses of senses, there are
no distinct intensions of intensions.
3This shows a more pragmatic motivation for considering non-extensional concept for-
malization, for in practice we often assert that concepts, which we clearly consider to be
different concepts, are co-extensional.
4The only work we have seen which clearly states the opposite i.e. that concepts (here
called classes) are extensional is [Goodman and Quine, 1947]. However, since then it has
been established that intensional logic (at least the ones we consider) can be defined in
extensional settings, so we do not consider this to be incoherent with the present work.
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erally acknowledged answer to what senses and intensions are.5 On the other
hand—as we see the situation—this does not prevent formalization of inten-
sions, it merely means that there are different formalizations of intensions,
and in the following sections we present some alternatives which are coherent
with the contributions described in Chapter 2.
In terms of extensional formalizations, in contrast to intensional formal-
izations, we formally identify co-extensional concepts although we can and
may want to discern between them. This explains why we are interested in
intensional formalizations of concepts and intensional concept logics.
Concepts are related to properties as they are construed in property the-
ory [Bealer and Mo¨nnich, 1989; Jubien, 1989; Menzel, 1986; Swoyer, 1998;
Turner, 1987; Weingartner, 1974], since both concepts and properties are said
to be intensional. However, ’property’ appears to be used more generally
than ’concept’, and foundational issues are often the motivation for property
theories, instead of knowledge representation.
It should be noted that some papers concerning intensional representation
and intensional semantics of concepts exist, see [Maida and Shapiro, 1982;
Cappelli and Mazzeranghi, 1994]. We do not find these papers fully satisfy-
ing. Amongst other things, the former is almost informal, whereas the latter
adopts the semantics of data types in programming languages. Nonetheless,
the papers show that intensionality has been combined with knowledge rep-
resentation before.
5.2 Defining the Intensional Concept Logic
5.2.1 An Appetizer
The intensional concept logic is based upon Carnap’s distinction between
extension and intension. We therefore recognize two kinds of conceptual
knowledge: extensional and intensional. A concept logic should facilitate
expressions of both, and our logic allows one to express
• extensional relations between concepts; more precisely, the logic has a
connective for expressing that concepts have the same extension;
• intensional relations between concepts; more precisely, the logic has a
connective for expressing that concepts have the same intension.
5When we say that concepts are defined by their intensions, it means, from a formal
point of view, merely that we use a more restrictive condition for identifying concepts than
simply assuming that co-extensional concepts are identical.
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To express that two concepts c and d have the same extension, i.e. are
co-extensional, we shall write
c ≡ d.
This relation will actually be similar to the ≡ relation of ALC in that they
have the same semantics.
To express that two concepts c and d are co-intensional, we shall write
c = d.
By means of these two kinds of expressions we can capture the infamous
example regarding the relations between the concepts featherless biped, ra-
tional animal and human which are assumed to be co-extensional but not
co-intensional:
human ≡ featherless biped,
human = rational animal.
The former equation expresses that human and featherless biped are co-exten-
sional. The latter equation expresses that rational animal and human are
co-intensional, meaning that human is defined as rational animal. The two
equivalence relations are related such that whenever we have c = d then c ≡ d
(in correspondence with the principle that intension determines extension),
thus we have that human and rational animal are co-extensional.
We also have an extensional subsumption relation, c v d, which expresses
that every individual which belongs to the extension of c also belongs to
the extension of d. And an intensional subsumption relation, c ≤ d, which
expresses that c is intensionally included in d. Now,
human v biped,
human ≤ animal,
express that every human is a biped, and that human is an intensional sub-
concept of animal. (We explain more about this later.)
If we compare our two notions of equivalence with Carnap’s notion of
equivalence and L-equivalence, we get that extensional equivalence (≡) is re-
lated to Carnap’s equivalence, and that intensional equivalence (=) is related
to L-equivalence. There is one important difference, though, our notions of
equivalence are not dependent on extra-linguistic knowledge, since the seman-
tics of the logic will be formally defined.
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It should be noted that we (deliberately) have not (yet) said anything
about what the intension of a concept is. The logic consists merely of a
connective for expressing “sameness” and subsumption of intensions, and not
for expressing what intensions are.
5.2.2 Syntax
The syntax of the logic is closely similar to the syntax of the description logic
ALC. Besides the = relation, the two logics will have the same syntax as we
can see from the following two definitions.
Definition 10 Let C be a set of atomic concepts and let R be a set of atomic
roles. The set of concept descriptions TC is defined as the least set satisfying
1. Every atomic concept, including the universal concept >, is a concept
description.
2. If c and d are concept descriptions then the concept conjunction c u d
is a concept description.
3. If d is a concept description then the concept negation ¬d is a concept
description.
4. If d is a concept description and r is an atomic role, then the value
restriction ∀r.d is a concept description.
We use the same abbreviations asALC, so the bottom concept⊥ stands for ¬>,
concept disjunction cunionsq d stands for ¬(¬cu¬d), and existential quantification
∃r.c stands for ¬∀r.(¬c).
Then we can define the different kinds of concept axioms.
Definition 11 Let c, d ∈ TC be concept descriptions, then
1. c ≡ d is a concept equivalence between c and d;
2. c = d is a concept identity between c and d;
3. c v d is an extensional subsumption relation between c and d;
4. c ≤ d is an intensional subsumption relation between c and d.
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Concept axiom is used as common term for concept equivalence, concept iden-
tity, extensional subsumption relation, or intensional subsumption relation.
In order to have a common notation, let
c ∼= d
denote either a concept equivalence or a concept identity.
5.2.3 Extensional Semantics
The following extensional semantics is an algebraic formulation of the seman-
tics of ALC.
Definition 12 Let T be a set of concept axioms and let U be a universe of
discourse. An extensional model of T is a mapping ε : C → 2U (as well as a
mapping ε : R → 2U×U ) which extends to a homomorphism ε˜ : TC → 2U by
the following definition:
ε˜(>) = U
ε˜(c u d) = ε˜(c) ∩ ε˜(d)
ε˜(¬c) = {ε˜(c) = U\ε˜(c)
ε˜(∀r.c) = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U) 〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈ ε˜(c)}
for all c, d ∈ TC and r ∈ R, and which satisfies the axioms of T , that is, for
all c ≡ d ∈ T we have ε˜(c) = ε˜(d), and for all c = d ∈ T we have ε˜(c) = ε˜(d),
and for all c v d ∈ T we have ε˜(c) ⊆ ε˜(d), and for all c ≤ d ∈ T we have
ε˜(c) ⊆ ε˜(d).
We say that T entails c ≡ d and write
T |= c ≡ d
if for all extensional models ε of T we have ε˜(c) = ε˜(d). Moreover, we say
that T entails c v d and write
T |= c v d
if for all extensional models ε of T we have ε˜(c) ⊆ ε˜(d).
If T does not entail c ≡ d, we write T 6|= c ≡ d.
This definition should be compared to the definition of the semantics of the
description logicALC. There is no essential difference between the two (except
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that we (for now) do not consider ABoxes). This means that the extensional
semantics of the intensional concept logic is the same as the semantics of ALC,
hence if T consists only of concept equivalences and extensional subsumption
relations then T |=ALC c ≡ d if and only if T |= c ≡ d for all c, d ∈ TC .6
Under the extensional semantics there is no difference between extensional
concept axioms (≡,v) and intensional concept axioms (=,≤), in the sense
that c ≡ d is satisfied by ε if and only if c = d is satisfied by ε and similarly for
subsumptions. Under the intensional semantics, we will (of course) discern
between extensional and intensional axioms. Later it will become apparent
that this (together with the remaining definitions) means that concept identity
implies concept equivalence.
The codomain of an extensional interpretation is a power set algebra,
which satisfies X = X ∩Y if and only if X ⊆ Y for all X,Y ⊆ U . This means
that we get c v d is satisfied by ε if and only if c ≡ c u d is satisfied by ε
for all concept descriptions c and d. From a semantical point of view, the
extensional subsumption relation v is therefore superfluous since it can be
expressed by means of extensional equivalence.
The fact that description logics may be given an algebraic semantics is
not new, see [Brink and Schmidt, 1992; Brink et al., 1994], and [Blackburn et
al., 2001] which presents the algebraic semantics of the related modal logics.
The idea of following an algebraic approach to knowledge representation was
brought to my attention by Prof. Jørgen Fischer Nilsson.
5.2.4 Intensional Semantics
It is useful to go into more details about the algebraic formulation of the
extensional semantics. The intensional semantics is namely an algebraic gen-
eralization of the extensional semantics.
The syntactic domain, that is, the set TC of concept descriptions, may be
considered an algebra (TC ,u,¬, (∀r.(·))r∈R,>). This algebra includes a whole
family (∀r.(·))r∈R of operations, one for each atomic role. The codomain
of a given extensional model ε : C → 2U is first of all a Boolean algebra
(2U ,∩, {, U), but it is endowed with additional structure due to the value
restrictions. A family of operations (f∩r )r∈R exists, each corresponding to
the interpretation of an atomic role (note, ∀r.(·) is a piece of syntax, f∩r is
a corresponding operator). Each mapping f∩r : 2U → 2U of this family is
6The reason for this difference is that this chapter follows an algebraic approach to
logic where definitions like the one above are customary, in contrast to the more common
approach followed by description logicians.
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defined by
f∩r (Z) = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈ Z}
given an extensional model ε. The codomain of an extensional model is there-
fore an algebra (2U ,∩, {, (f∩r )r∈R, U), and such an algebra is a concrete exam-
ple of a Boolean algebra with operators [Jo´nsson and Tarski, 1951]; it is also
known as a complex algebra.7 An extensional model ε is a mapping from C
to a complex algebra:
ε : C −→ (2U ,∩, {, (f∩r )r∈R, U).
Moreover, it extends by definition to a homomorphism:
ε˜ : (TC ,u,¬, (∀r.(·))r∈R,>) −→ (2U ,∩, {, (f∩r )r∈R, U).
The intensional semantics works in principle the same way. An intensional
model is also (more precisely, it consists of) a mapping from C which extends
to a homomorphism, however, there is one important difference, the codomain
of the mapping is not a complex algebra. Instead, we are inspired by the prop-
erty theory of George Bealer, see [Bealer, 1982; Bealer and Mo¨nnich, 1989]
and the related [Menzel, 1986; Swoyer, 1998].8 The underlying idea is that
the intensional semantics arises through interpretation over weaker structures,
that is, over algebras satisfying fewer identities. In our case these algebras
are called intensional algebras, and they are simply semilattices endowed with
additional structure due to value restrictions.
To contrast the algebras of the extensional semantics with the intensional
algebras, we will simply call these algebras for extensional algebras.
Definition 13 An intensional algebra is a tuple (I,×,∼, (f×r )r∈R, 1I) con-
sisting of a non-empty set I, a binary operation × on I, a unary operation
∼ on I, a constant 1I ∈ I, and an R-indexed family of mappings on I which
7Our operators are structure preserving with respect to ∩, meaning they are dual of the
ones in [Jo´nsson and Tarski, 1951].
8Our approach is, amongst other things, distinguished from Bealer’s because we have
both extensional and intensional interpretations, commutativity, and (later) an infinite hi-
erarchy of senses. On the other hand, we consider more simple logics than Bealer who
considers first-order logic.
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satisfies
x× x = x
x× y = y × x
x× (y × z) = (x× y)× z
x× 1I = x
f×r (x× y) = f×r (x)× f×r (y)
f×r (1I) = 1I
for all x, y, z ∈ I and r ∈ R.
We may give the intensional algebras the following informal interpretation.
Intensional algebras are formalizations of intensions of concepts, meaning the
operations ×,∼, f×r , and 1I are operations on intensions. The axioms simply
state that intensional conjunction × is idempotent, commutative, and asso-
ciative. It has been philosophically justified in [Swoyer, 1998] that conjunction
has these algebraic properties.
We had several considerations regarding the axiomatization of negation.
In an earlier paper about this work [Oldager, 2003], intensional negation was
axiomatized as involution, viz. ∼∼x = x, following a suggestion of [Swoyer,
1998]. Alternatively, intensional negation could be defined such that it is
order reversing, that is, as ∼(x × y) × (∼x) = ∼x. However, as there are
other viable axiomatizations of negation, and as we wanted the intensional
semantics to be as general as possible (under a certain assumption which is to
be described later), we have simply dropped the axiom, such that there are no
axioms for intensional negation. When we in Section 5.3 discuss that different
axiomatizations of the intensional algebras give rise to different conceptions
of intensionality, this choice should be motivated.
With this axiomatization the conjunction of an intension with its negation
does not (necessarily) yield the least intension, although this is the case in
the extensional algebras where x ∩ {x = ∅, because we are not guaranteed
existence of a least element.
As we shall see shortly, the axiom x×1I = x means that 1I is the greatest
intension. It may be considered a neutral intension with respect to conjunc-
tion. Moreover, since the roles preserve the structure of their arguments, they
are endomorphisms on I. We find this intuitively acceptable, unfortunately,
we have not found any justification for this in the philosophical literature.
(This should not be taken to mean that the opposite has been justified, but
merely that value restrictions, as far as we know, have not been discussed
(yet) in the philosophical literature.)
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Before we present the intensional semantics the following relation needs to
be introduced. Let (I,×,∼, (f×r )r∈R, 1I) be an intensional algebra. We can
define a partial order  on I by
x  y if and only if x = x× y.
It can be shown that  is an order-theoretic semilattice, that is, a partial
order with binary infima (greatest lower bounds). Conversely, given a partial
order ′ on I with binary infima we can define a binary operation ×′ on I by
x ×′ y is equal to the infimum of x and y. It can also be shown that (I,×′)
is a semilattice, and that the definitions are the inverses of each other such
that  = ′ if and only if × = ×′. The proofs can be found in most books
on lattice theory, see for instance [Davey and Priestley, 1990].
In other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the partial
orders with binary infima and semilattices. Semilattices are the most general
algebras with this property as any other axiomatization either would be less
general than the suggested axiomatization (satisfy more axioms) or would not
have the correspondence between conjunction and subsumption.
The partial order  will be used for formalizing intensional subsump-
tion relations between concepts. In other words,  formalizes an intensional
taxonomy. It is therefore no coincidence that we have chosen semilattices as
intensional algebras, since we then have the most general algebras where there
is a correspondence between concept conjunction and concept subsumption,
both of which are fundamental in knowledge representation.
The definition below presents the intensional semantics of the concept
logic. It should be noted that in the following the algebras will not be concrete
(set-theoretic) but abstract.
Definition 14 Let T be a set of concept axioms, (I,×,∼, (f×r )r∈R, 1I) an
intensional algebra, and (E,∧,¬, (f∧r )r∈R, 1E) an extensional algebra. An
intensional model of T is a pair (ι, τ) of mappings ι : C → I and τ : I → E
such that τ ◦ι is an extensional model of T , and ι extends to a homomorphism
ι˜ : TC → I by the following definition:
ι˜(>) = 1I
ι˜(c u d) = ι˜(c)× ι˜(d)
ι˜(¬c) = ∼ ι˜(c)
ι˜(∀r.c) = f×r (ι˜(c))
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for all c, d ∈ TC and r ∈ R, and which satisfies the intensional axioms of T ,
that is, for all c = d ∈ T we have ι˜(c) = ι˜(d); and for all c ≤ d ∈ T we have
ι˜(c)  ι˜(d).
We say that T entails c = d and write
T |= c = d
if for all intensional models (ι, τ) of T we have ι˜(c) = ι˜(d). Moreover, we say
that T entails c ≤ d and write
T |= c ≤ d
if for all intensional models (ι, τ) of T we have ι˜(c)  ι˜(d).
If T does not entail c = d we write T 6|= c = d.
Similar to extensional subsumption, the intensional subsumption relation
may be dispensed since it can be expressed by means of concept conjunction
and concept identity, i.e. c ≤ d is satisfied if and only if c = c u d is satisfied,
as argued above. For the next sections (until we consider applications), we
restrict our investigations to concept identities and concept equivalences.
5.2.5 Verification of Intensionality
The following shows the intensionality result, which verifies that the concept
logic is intensional.
Theorem 15 The intensional concept logic is intensional.
Proof. We show by means of a counter example where a, b ∈ C that
a ≡ b 6|= a = b,
which shows the wanted as a ≡ b |= a = a holds. The free extensional model
for a ≡ b is
εF (>)
εF (a) = εF (b)
77ooooooooooo
¬εF (a)
eeKKKKKKKKKK
¬εF (>)
99ssssssssss
ggOOOOOOOOOOO
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Instead of considering the free intensional model generated by {a, b}, which
is infinitely large, we construct two intensional models (ι′, τ ′) and (ι′′, τ ′′) as
follows:
ι′(>)
ι′(a) = ∼∼ ι′(a)
77nnnnnnnnnnnn
ι′(b)
OO
∼ ι′(a) = ∼ ι′(b)
``AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
∼ ι′(>)
ggPPPPPPPPPPPPP
77nnnnnnnnnnnn
where τ ′(ι′(a)) = τ ′(ι′(b)) = εF (a), τ ′(∼ ι′(a)) = ¬εF (a); and
ι′′(>)
ι′′(b) = ∼∼ ι′′(b)
66nnnnnnnnnnnn
ι′′(a)
OO
∼ ι′′(a) = ∼ ι′′(b)
``BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
∼ ι′′(>)
hhPPPPPPPPPPPPP
66nnnnnnnnnnnn
where τ ′′(ι′′(a)) = τ ′′(ι′′(b)) = εF (a) and τ ′′(∼ ι′′(a)) = ¬εF (a). We verify
that (ι′, τ ′) and (ι′′, τ ′′) are intensional models for a ≡ b in that the codomains
of ι′, ι′′ are semilattices, and τ ′◦ι′ and τ ′′◦ι′′ are extensional models. We have
ι′(a) ≺ ι′(b) and ι′′(b) ≺ ι′′(a), thus a = b is not satisfied in these models.9 
As another result we have that co-intensional formulas may be freely sub-
stituted for each other. This means that the intensional concept logic satisfies
Carnap’s definition of intensionality where co-intensional expressions are sub-
stitutable.
Proposition 16 Let c, d, e ∈ TC be concept descriptions, then we have
c = d |= e = e[d/c]
9The two intensional models show that neither T |= a ≤ b nor T |= b ≤ a.
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and
c = d |= e ≡ e[d/c]
for all c, d, e, where e[d/c] denotes the result of substituting an occurrence of
c with d in e.
Proof. The proofs proceed by structural induction on the concept description
e. (We need not show the full proofs as argued in connection with the algebraic
extensionality result for modal logic in Chapter 3.) 
As a corollary of this proposition, we get that concept identity implies
concept equivalence, that is,
c = d |= c ≡ d (5.1)
for all c, d ∈ TC .
Many other results may be derived. We have for example
c ≡ d, d = e |= c ≡ e
c ≡ d, d = e 6|= c = e
for all c, d, e ∈ TC .
5.2.6 Relations between the Extensional and Intensional Se-
mantics
As shown above, the extensional and the intensional semantics are related (as
we would expect). Now we examine this relation more closely.
One of the aims of this section is to show the relation between the alge-
braic semantics and the informal discussions about intensionality in Chapter
2, hence motivate that the algebraic semantics is in accordance with the con-
tributions.
The proposition below shows that the intensional semantics subsumes the
extensional in the sense that every extensional model gives rise to an inten-
sional model. Note that the extensional semantics is equivalent to modal
logic Km, hence the result shows that the intensional semantics subsumes
this logic.
Proposition 17 Let ε : C → 2U be an extensional model of a set T of
concept axioms and let id2U be the identity mapping on 2U . Then (ε, id2U ) is
an intensional model of T .
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Proof. We verify that (2U ,∩, {, (f∩r )r∈R, U) is an intensional algebra. First,
∩ is idempotent, commutative, and associative. Second, U is maximum, and
third, each operator f∩r : 2U → 2U is structure preserving (an endomorphism):
f∩r (W ∩ Z) = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈ (W ∩ Z)}
= {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈W} ∩
{x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈ Z}
= f∩r (W ) ∩ f∩r (Z)
for all W,Z ⊆ U and r ∈ R;
f∩r (U) = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ ε(r)→ y ∈ U} = U.
Moreover, every concept identity and every intensional subsumption relation
of T are satisfied by (ε, id2U ) because ε is an extensional model of T . Finally,
we see that id2U ◦ ε = ε is an extensional model of T . 
As a corollary of this proposition we get that
T |= c = d implies T |= c ≡ d, (5.2)
because, by contraposition, if c ≡ d is not satisfied by an extensional model ε
of T , then ε˜(c) 6= ε˜(d) and (ε, id) is an intensional model of T meaning there
is an intensional model (ε, id) in which ε˜(c) 6= ε˜(d). Hence T 6|= c = d. Note
that this result is similar to (5.1), however, it is obtained differently.
Similarly, we have the corollary
T |= c ≤ d implies T |= c v d.
The contributions to intensionality (see Chapter 2) assert that intension
(sense) determines extension (denotation). This relation can be made precise
in our setting. Every intensional model (ι, τ) is defined such that τ ◦ ι is an
extensional model. This extensional model is the unique mapping with this
property (any other extensional model satisfying the commutativity condition
will obviously be equal to τ ◦ ι).
The converse is not true, however. As we saw in the proof of Theorem
15, given an extensional model ε, there may exist several intensional models
(ι′, τ ′), (ι′′τ ′′) such that commutativity holds, that is, such that τ ′ ◦ ι′ = τ ′′ ◦
ι′′ = ε although ι′ 6= ι′′. In other words, an intensional model gives rise to
(determines) a unique extensional, however, an extensional model does not
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give rise to (determines) a unique intensional model. This may be presented
by the following commuting diagram
I
τ
?
??
??
??
?
C
ι
??
τ◦ι //______ E
Notice that this diagram is similar to the diagram describing the relations
between sense and denotation in Chapter 2.
We may comment further on the relation between the extensional and the
intensional semantics. An intensional model is a pair (ι, τ) such that τ ◦ι is an
extensional model. By means of ι the model formulates the intensions of the
concepts, and by means of τ (together with ι) it formulates their extensions;
τ is—we say—a mediation between the intensions and the extensions. The
following proposition shows that τ forms a homomorphism.
Proposition 18 Let (ι : C → I, τ : I → E) be an intensional model, let ι[C]
denote the image of ι and let Iι denote the image of ι˜. Then the restriction
τι : ι[C] → E of τ extends to a homomorphism τ˜ : Iι → E such that τ˜ ◦ ι˜ =
τ˜ ◦ ι.
Proof. Let the homomorphic extension τ˜ of τι be defined as usual. We proceed
by induction on the structure of the argument. For the base case:
τ˜ ◦ ι˜(a) = τ˜(ι(a)) = τ ◦ ι(a) = τ˜ ◦ ι(a)
where a ∈ C. For concept conjunctions we get
τ˜ ◦ ι˜(c u d) = τ˜ ◦ ι˜(c) ∧ τ˜ ◦ ι˜(d) = τ˜ ◦ ι(c) ∧ τ˜ ◦ ι(d) = τ˜ ◦ ι(c u d)
where c, d ∈ TC . The remaining cases are shown similarly. 
It should be noted that τ need not be a homomorphism.10
We have therefore shown that the commuting diagram above may be ex-
tended to concept descriptions, meaning commutativity also holds for models:
Iι
τ˜
>
>>
>>
>>
TC
ι˜
>>}}}}}}}}
τ˜◦ι
//_______ E
10The inconvenience that there may be a difference between τ and τ˜ is not important. It
follows merely from the fact that we wanted the definition of an intensional model to look
nice.
82 Intensional Concept Logic
The fact that τ : I → E forms a homomorphism means that we can define
τ˜ set-theoretically because the extensional algebra E is a complex algebra
(2U ,∩, {, (f∩r )r∈R, U):
τ˜(1I) = U
τ˜(x× y) = τ˜(x) ∩ τ˜(y)
τ˜(∼ x) = {(τ˜(x)) = U\τ˜(x)
τ˜(f×r (x)) = f
∩
r (τ˜(x))
= {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)〈x, y〉 ∈ τ˜(r)→ y ∈ τ˜(x)}
5.2.7 Proof Theory
There are several approaches to follow when one wants to present a proof
theory. The proof theory of the intensional concept logics follows the approach
used in equational logic. This casts further light on the algebraic approach
to logic which rarely has been followed in knowledge representation.
Basically, the intensional concept logic comprises two equational logics,
one follows from the concept equivalences and the other from the concept
identities. Moreover, these logics are united into one, in that the latter implies
the former, cf. (5.1). This means that the proof theory to a large extend can
follow the approach used in equational logic. Note that axiomatic proof theory
is often not considered in description logics. Tableau algorithms, which are
less intuitive but more appropriate for implementation, are considered instead.
The results and definitions from equational logic that are not described
in details below may be found in [Burris and Sankappanavar, 1981] which is
available on the Web.
Concept equivalence is axiomatized as a Boolean algebra with unary op-
erators. We have therefore the following logical axioms for equivalence:
c u d ≡ d u c c unionsq d ≡ d unionsq c
c u (d u e) ≡ (c u d) u e c unionsq (d unionsq e) ≡ (c unionsq d) unionsq e
c u (d unionsq e) ≡ (c u d) unionsq (c u e) c unionsq (d u e) ≡ (c unionsq d) u (c unionsq e)
c u > ≡ c c unionsq ⊥ ≡ c
c u ¬c ≡ ⊥ c unionsq ¬c ≡ >
∀r.(c u d) ≡ ∀r.(c) u ∀r.(d) ∃r.(c unionsq d) ≡ ∃r.(c) unionsq ∃r.(d)
∀r.> ≡ > ∃r.⊥ ≡ ⊥
for all c, d, e ∈ TC and r ∈ R. c unionsq d is an abbreviation of ¬(¬c u ¬d), ⊥
an abbreviation of ¬>, and ∃r.c an abbreviation of ¬(∀r.(¬c)) as mentioned
earlier.
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Concept identity is axiomatized as a bounded semilattice with unary op-
erators (similar to the intensional algebras, Definition 13). Therefore, we have
the following logical axioms for identity:
c u c = c
c u d = d u c
c u (d u e) = (c u d) u e
c u > = c
∀r.(c u d) = ∀r.(c) u ∀r.(d)
∀r.> = >
for all c, d, e ∈ TC and r ∈ R. Note that since the logical axioms hold for all
concept descriptions, they are actually axiom schemas.
We have the following proof rules for all concepts descriptions c, d, and e
Reflexivity
c ≡ c c = c
Symmetry
c ≡ d
d ≡ c
c = d
d = c
Transitivity
c ≡ d d ≡ e
c ≡ e
c = d d = e
c = e
Replacement
c ≡ d
e(c) ≡ e(d)
c = d
e(c) = e(d)
Intensionality
c = d
c ≡ d
where e(c) denotes a term e in which c occurs as a subterm, and e(d) denotes
the result of replacing the occurrence of c with d in e. All proof rules, but the
last one, are well-known in equational logic. The last proof rule is motivated
by the fact that concept identity implies concept equivalence, cf. (5.1).
Definition 19 Let T be a set of concept axioms. If there exists a finite
sequence of concept axioms
c1 ∼= d1, . . . , cn ∼= dn
such that cn ∼= dn is c ∼= d, and every member of the sequence is a logi-
cal axiom, or a member of T , or the consequent of a proof rule where the
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antecedent(s) are previous members of the sequence, we say that T proves
c ∼= d, and write
T ` c ∼= d.
The sequence c1 ∼= d1, . . . , cn ∼= dn is called a formal deduction of c ∼= d.
The reader familiar with equational logic may have recognized that a sub-
stitution proof rule is missing. The reason for this omission is that the concept
logic does not contain any variables. A substitution rule would therefore be
”idle”.
We could have included variables, however, as this is far from being com-
mon in concept logics (recall, the special variable-free syntax of ALC), we
have not done it. Let us assume that we included variables, then we should
have added proof rules for uniform variable substitutions:
Substitution11
c ≡ d
(c ≡ d)[e/x]
c = d
(c = d)[e/x]
where (c ≡ d)[e/x] denotes the result of substituting all occurrences of the
variable x with e in c ≡ d, and similarly for (c = d)[e/x]. Now we can see
that the primitive concepts cannot be variables, because (by means of the
Substitution rule) we get, for example,
{a1 ≡ a2} ` a1 ≡ a3, {a1 ≡ a2} ` a1 ≡ a4, . . .
where a1, a2, . . . are primitive concepts.
Thus, given a concept axiom {a1 ≡ a2}, we get that all primitive concepts
are equivalent, and this is not what is intended by the concept axiom a1 ≡ a2
(cf. the extensional semantics). Hence the primitive concepts cannot be
variables.
Instead, the primitive concepts are constants. This means that the type
(algebraically speaking) of the concept logic actually is
(u,¬, (∀r.(·))r∈R,>, a1, a2, . . . )
rather than (u,¬, (∀r.(·))r∈R,>). Moreover, the term algebra is denoted by
TC(∅) to emphasize that the set of variables is empty. However, this is not
important for the results, so we will abstract from these technicalities.
11Note that these two proof rules are not part of the proof theory of the intensional
concept logic.
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5.2.8 Towards Completeness
This section presents definitions necessary for proving completeness. Al-
though closely related, our approach is distinguished from that of equational
logic [Burris and Sankappanavar, 1981] by a number of issues: we have two
types of identities (≡ and =), we have an additional proof rule (Intensional-
ity), we lack variables and Substitution proof rules, and we show completeness
with respect to every set of concept axioms.
Let Id(C) denote the set of concept axioms (such that all of its concept
descriptions belong to TC).
Let us define the following mappings
γ(S) = {(c, d) | c ∼= d ∈ S}
γ≡(S) = {(c, d) | c ≡ d ∈ S}
and let γ−1≡ be the inverse of γ≡. Then γ−1≡ ◦ γ maps a set of concept axioms
to a set of concept equivalences.
Let S be a set of concept equivalences over TC . The deductive closure
D(S) of S is the least set of concept equivalences over TC containing S such
that for all c ∈ TC , c ≡ c ∈ D(S), and such that
1. if c ≡ d ∈ D(S) then d ≡ c ∈ D(S),
2. if c ≡ d ∈ D(S) and d ≡ e ∈ D(S) then c ≡ e ∈ D(S),
3. if c ≡ d ∈ D(S) and e(c) ∈ TC where c occurs as a subterm of e, let
e(d) denote the result of replacing the occurrence of c with d in e, then
e(c) ≡ e(d) ∈ D(S).
These properties are called closure properties. A set closed under the third
property, for example, is said to be closed under replacement, moreover, we
say that a right hand side of a closure property is derived from the left hand
side; for example, d ≡ c is derived from c ≡ d under the first closure property.
Later we do not allow use of the Intensionality proof rule. We therefore
introduce an additional proof relation `E which is defined by: T `E c ≡ d
if T ` c ≡ d and the Intensional proof rule has not been used in the formal
deduction of c ≡ d. Moreover, we will split a set of concept axioms T into
two sets of concept equivalences by the following definitions
T E = {c ≡ d | c ≡ d ∈ T }
T I = {c ≡ d | c = d ∈ T }.
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A fully invariant congruence θ on an algebra A is a congruence (an equiva-
lence relation satisfying the compatibility property) such that for all x, y ∈ A
and every endomorphism α on A, (x, y) ∈ θ implies (αx, αy) ∈ θ. Let X
be a binary relation over A, then ΘFI(X) denotes the least fully invariant
congruence containing X.
5.2.9 Completeness
Because of the special syntax of the concept logic (which does not include
implications hence no general notion of entailment within the logic), we will
show more general soundness and completeness results. When formulating
knowledge bases, it is of little relevance to know that the logic is sound and
complete with respect to empty knowledge bases only. Hence instead of prov-
ing |= c = d if and only if ` c = d, we will prove soundness and completeness
with respect to any set of concept axioms.
Now we are ready to show that the intensional concept logic is sound and
complete.
Theorem 20 (Soundness and Completeness.) Let T be a set of concept ax-
ioms and c and d concept descriptions. Then T |= c ≡ d if and only if
T ` c ≡ d, and T |= c = d if and only if T ` c = d.
Proof. We only show the result for concept equivalences, which is the most
difficult case because of the additional proof rule (Intensionality). We have
to refer to the logical axioms, so let Σ denote the set of logical axioms.
The proof consists of four steps:
1. T ` c ≡ d if and only if T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d,
2. T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d if and only if c ≡ d ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )),
3. c ≡ d ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) if and only if (c, d) ∈ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )),
4. (c, d) ∈ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) if and only if T |= c ≡ d.
(1. ⇒) If T ` c ≡ d then there may be several formal deductions of c ≡ d.
Among these there exists a formal deduction in which the Intensionality rule
is either used only on the concept identities of T or not used at all. Now
we show how to see this. If the Intensionality rule is used at step i in the
formal deduction, that is, if we have that ci ≡ di is a consequent of ci = di
then there are different cases to consider. If ci = di is a logical axiom or a
consequent of the Reflexivity rule, then there is a corresponding extensional
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axiom or rule ci ≡ di which we obtain without use of Intensionality. If ci = di
is a consequent of another proof rule, say Symmetry, then we have a subse-
quence di = ci, ci = di, ci ≡ di of the formal deduction, but then there is an
alternative subsequence that starts by using the Intensionality rule and then
use Symmetry: di = ci, di ≡ ci, ci ≡ di. Similar arguments can be made for
the remaining proof rules. This presents a method in which the Intensional-
ity rule is used gradually earlier and earlier in the sequence. Since a proof
consists of a finite sequence, this method will eventually terminate, such that
the Intensionality rule is used only on concept identities of T—if it is used at
all.
Now, if the Intensionality rule is not used for establishing T ` c ≡ d
then we have T E `E c ≡ d, thus also T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d. Otherwise, if the
Intensionality rule is used, then the abovementioned formal deduction exists,
which means that T I ∪ T E proves c ≡ d, moreover, once the identities of T
are transformed into equivalences, we need not use the Intensionality rule,
hence T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d, which shows the wanted.
(1.⇐) Assume T I∪T E `E c ≡ d. Every member of T I used in the formal
deduction of c ≡ d can be obtained from T by means of the Intensionality
proof rule. Since we for establishing T ` c ≡ d may use the same logical
axioms and more proof rules than we use for establishing T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d,
then we also have T ` c ≡ d.
(2. ⇒) All logical axioms that are concept equivalences and all members
of T I ∪ T E are also members of D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )). Moreover, we have used
properties under which the deductive closure is closed in the construction of
a formal (`E) deduction.
(2. ⇐) By means of the Reflexivity proof rule we can prove c ≡ c for all
c ∈ TC , moreover, every axiom of γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ∪ T ) can be proven, since we can
prove T I ∪ T E and all logical axioms that are equivalences.
If we can prove c ≡ d, then there is a formal deduction c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn
of c ≡ d. By the Symmetry proof rule, we have a sequence
c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn, dn ≡ cn.
Thus we have proved d ≡ c.
If we can prove c ≡ d and d ≡ e, we have two formal deductions
c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn and d′1 ≡ e1, . . . , d′m ≡ em.
But then we have, by applying the Transitivity rule on the last members of
each of the sequences (since dn is d′m)
c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn, d′1 ≡ e1, . . . , d′m ≡ em, cn ≡ em,
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which is a formal deduction of c ≡ e.
If we can prove c ≡ d, there is a formal deduction c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn. If
e ∈ TC contains c as a subterm and e(d) denotes the result of replacing the
occurrence of c with d in e, then by the Replacement rule, we have a formal
deduction
c1 ≡ d1, . . . , cn ≡ dn, e(c) ≡ e(d)
of e(c) ≡ e(d).
We have therefore shown that
c ≡ d ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) implies T I ∪ T E `E c ≡ d.
(3.) By the definition of the deductive closure, we have that for all c ∈ TC ,
c ≡ c ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦γ(Σ∪T )), which together with the first two closure properties
ensure that γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) is an equivalence relation.
By the third closure property we get that γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) is a con-
gruence, because if c ≡ d ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) then since D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T ))
is closed under replacement and ¬c ≡ ¬c ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )), we get
¬c ≡ ¬d ∈ D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )). (This only shows the congruence property
with respect to negation; the other cases are similar).
D(S) is vacuously closed under uniform variable substitutions, since we
admit no variables. And as endomorphisms on the term algebra simply are
uniform variable substitutions, D(S) is fully invariant.
Since γ(Σ ∪ T ) ⊆ γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )), γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) is a fully
invariant congruence containing γ(Σ ∪ T ), and since ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) is the
least fully invariant congruence containing γ(Σ ∪ T ) we get
ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) ⊆ γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )).
Moreover, as D(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ∪ T )) is the least set satisfying the properties that
make it a fully invariant congruence containing γ(Σ ∪ T ), we get the wanted
converse
γD(γ−1≡ ◦ γ(Σ ∪ T )) ⊆ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )).
(4. ⇒) Consider the binary relation {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d}. Since
T |= c ≡ c
T |= c ≡ d implies T |= d ≡ c
T |= c ≡ d and T |= d ≡ e implies T |= c ≡ e
for all c, d, e ∈ TC , we see that {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d} is an equivalence relation.
5.2 Defining the Intensional Concept Logic 89
We see that {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d} is a congruence, because if
(c1, d1), (c2, d2) ∈ {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d}
then for every extensional model ε of T , ε˜(c1) = ε˜(d1) and ε˜(c2) = ε˜(d2),
hence
ε˜(c1 u c2) = ε˜(c1) ∧ ε˜(c2) = ε˜(d1) ∧ ε˜(d2) = ε˜(d1 u d2),
i.e. (c1 u c2, d1 u d2) ∈ {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d}. The cases for ¬ and ∀r.(·) are
similar.
We also see that {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d} is fully invariant, because if α is
an endomorphism on TC(∅) then, since the primitive concepts are nullary
operators and we have no variables, α(c) is vacuously equal to c for every
concept description c. Thus if (c, d) ∈ {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d} then (α(c), α(d)) ∈
{(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d}.
Since all logical axioms and concept axioms of T are entailed by T , we
have (c, d) ∈ γ(Σ ∪ T ) implies (c, d) ∈ {(c, d) | T |= c ≡ d}. And since
ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T ) is the least fully invariant congruence containing γ(Σ ∪ T ) we
get
(c, d) ∈ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) implies T |= c ≡ d.
(4. ⇐) Consider the quotient algebra TC/ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )). We can define
a mapping εFI : C → TC/ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) such that a primitive concept is
mapped to its equivalence class, i.e., εFI(a) = [a]Θ.12 By the usual definition
this map extends to a homomorphism ε˜FI : TC → TC/ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) such
that for all c ∈ TC , ε˜FI(c) = [c]Θ. As γ(Σ) ⊆ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )), we get that
TC/ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) is an extensional algebra. We verify, for example, that
meet is commutative, that is, for all c, d ∈ TC :
[c]Θ ∧TC/Θ [d]Θ = [c u d]Θ = [d u c]Θ = [d]Θ ∧TC/Θ [c]Θ,
where the second identity follows from the fact that c u d ≡ d u c ∈ Σ.
Moreover, as γ(T ) ⊆ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) we have that every concept axiom c ∼=
d ∈ T is satisfied by ε˜FI, since for every c, d ∈ TC ,
ε˜FI(c) = [c]Θ = [d]Θ = ε˜FI(d)
assuming that c ∼= d ∈ T . But this means that ε˜FI is an extensional model of
T , thus by the assumption T |= c ≡ d we get
ε˜FI(c) = ε˜FI(d),
12To keep things simple, we use Θ as index instead of the more correct ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )).
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that is, [c]Θ = [d]Θ. Hence (c, d) ∈ ΘFI(γ(Σ ∪ T )) if T |= c ≡ d. 
As a corollary we get that ALC is sound and complete (with respect
to `E), because if we have no concept identities then the intensional logic
simply is ALC. Notice that if soundness and completeness of ALC has been
established, we may skip the last three steps of the proof.
5.2.10 Existence of Mediations between the Extensional and
Intensional Models
Now we return to the issue about the mediations (Section 5.2.6). The in-
tensional algebras are defined as abstract algebras and not concretely (set-
theoretically). A mediation τ maps, as shown above, abstract intensions to
concrete extensions. It is therefore interesting to establish when a non-trivial
mediation exists, i.e. a mapping τ : I → 2U such that U is non-empty, because
such a mapping gives a concrete (set-theoretic) and non-trivial interpretation
of the abstract intensional domain.
We consider therefore the following problem. Given a set of concept ax-
ioms T , imagine that we have a mapping ι : C → I satisfying T . Then we
want to establish whether there exists a τ : I → 2U such that τ ◦ ι is an
extensional model of T and U 6= ∅.
First of all we note that in general such a non-trivial mediation does not
exist. To see this, consider the case where T is {a ≡ b}. Now, we have the
following ι : C → I which (vacuously) satisfies T :
ι(a) = ∼ ι(a)
ι(b) = ∼ ι(b)
OO
If there exists a τ : I → 2U such that τ ◦ι is an extensional model of which U is
non-empty, then by Proposition 18 τ forms a homomorphism τ˜ such that τ˜ ◦ ι˜
is equal to the extension τ˜ ◦ ι of the extensional model τ ◦ι. However, then we
get that τ˜(∼ ι˜(a)) = τ˜(ι˜(a)), that is, ¬τ˜ ◦ ι(a) = τ˜ ◦ ι(a) contradicting that
U is non-empty (only a trivial Boolean algebra satisfies ¬x = x). In other
words, a non-trivial mediation τ cannot exist in this case.
There is another reason for investigating the existence of a mediation
τ , because if τ˜ always is an isomorphism (actually it merely needs to be
injective), then there is no difference between the extensional and intensional
entailment relations. To see this, note firstly that it suffices to show T |= c ≡ d
implies T |= c = d. Now, by contraposition, if (ι, τ) is an intensional model
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of T such that ι˜(c) 6= ι˜(d) then since τ˜ is injective τ˜(ι˜(c)) 6= τ˜(ι˜(d)), which by
Proposition 18 yields τ˜ ◦ ι(c) 6= τ˜ ◦ ι(d), hence T 6|= c ≡ d. In other words,
the mediations say something about the difference between the extensional
and intensional semantics.
Consider the proof of Proposition 17 which showed that the intensional
semantics subsumes the extensional. In this proof, we constructed an in-
tensional model from an extensional. It is then interesting to note that the
mediation was defined to be the identity, hence isomorphic. This means that
we so far actually have not shown that “genuine” intensional models in which
there is a difference between the extensional and intensional entailment re-
lations exist in general. This will be remedied below by considering the free
algebras.
Let FEC denote the free algebra over the class of the codomains of the
extensional models of T (the extensional algebras) and let FIC denote the free
algebra over the class of codomains of the first coordinate of the intensional
models of T (the intensional algebras). Note, as we from an algebraic point
of view have no variables, these algebras are freely generated by the empty
set.
Since the codomain of every extensional model is the codomain of the
first coordinate of an intensional model (Proposition 17), FEC is member of
the class of codomains of the first coordinate of the intensional models of
T . Now, by the universal mapping property for free algebras, this means
that there exists a unique homomorphism FIC → FEC (the mediation τ˜). This
shows that when we consider free algebras, there exists a mediating mapping
from the intensional algebra to the extensional algebra, which is non-trivial
if FEC is non-trivial. Moreover, we see that if F
E
C and F
I
C are not isomorphic
then τ˜ is not an isomorphism, meaning that there is a difference between the
extensional and intensional entailments.
The above shows that there may be a difference between whether we con-
sider each mapping into an intensional algebra or the models altogether (the
free algebras). As we already have shown, this does not affect the complete-
ness of the intensional concept logic.
5.3 Capturing Other Conceptions of Intensionality
When discussing Frege’s contribution, we noted that there are conditions for
identifying senses (hence also intensions) of different strengths (see the foot-
note on page 24). The identity conditions may be seen as following from
different conceptions of intensionality. The fact that we have different con-
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ceptions of intensions (or properties) is not new. It is for instance noted in
[Swoyer, 1998]. This section shows how other conceptions of intensionality
can be captured by modifying the intensional concept logic.
5.3.1 Intensional Boolean Concept Logic
The intensional algebras need not be semilattices. Now we show that the
intensional algebras can be defined as extensional algebras. Recall, the exten-
sional algebras are complex algebras which are concrete examples of Boolean
algebras with operators, or simply BAOs. In other words, the extensional al-
gebras are simply Boolean algebras (with additional structure). We show that
the intensional properties of the logic, which we call the intensional Boolean
concept logic, are preserved.
The definition of entailment (which we simply superscript with BAO)
follows the earlier definition under the intensional semantics (Definition 14),
it should therefore not be necessary to go through all details. Let T be a set
of concept axioms, and let
(E1,∧1,¬1, (f∧,1r )r∈R, 11) and (E2,∧2,¬2, (f∧,2r )r∈R, 12)
be extensional algebras. An intensional Boolean model is a pair (ε2, ε1) of
mappings ε2 : C → E2 and ε1 : E2 → E1 such that ε1 ◦ ε2 is an extensional
model of T , and such that the homomorphic extension ε˜2 of ε2 satisfies all
intensional concept axioms of T . Thus now E1 formalizes the extensions
and E2 formalizes the intensions which now are assumed to obey the laws of
Boolean algebras (with operators).
We write
T |=BAO c = d
if for every intensional Boolean model (ε2, ε1) of T we have ε˜2(c) = ε˜2(d).
The extensional semantics is as before, thus T |=BAO c ≡ d if and only if
T |= c ≡ d.
The following theorem shows that the intensional properties of this altered
concept logic are preserved. Although it is fairly obvious (due to the discus-
sion in Section 5.2.10), it is noteworthy because it shows that we have an
intensional logic although we make interpretations over extensional algebras
only. What gives rise to intensionality is simply the inclusion of the mod-
els. This suggests that intensionality, from a formal point of view, is about
considering supersets of models.
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Theorem 21 The intensional Boolean concept logic is intensional, moreover,
for all c, d, e ∈ TC :
c = d |=BAO e = e[d/c].
Proof. The first proof is similar to the one of Theorem 15. As a counter
example we have a ≡ b 6|= a = b where a, b ∈ C. We verify that the appropriate
model exists:
ε2(>)
ε2(a)
::uuuuuuuuu
¬ε2(b)
OO
x
eeJJJJJJJJJJJ
¬x
OO ::uuuuuuuuuu
ε2(b)
ddIIIIIIIII
99ttttttttttt
¬ε2(a)
OOeeJJJJJJJJJ
¬ε2(>)
ddIIIIIIIIII
OO 99ttttttttt
ε1 ◦ ε2(>)
ε1 ◦ ε2(a)
77ppppppppppp
¬ε1 ◦ ε2(a)
ggOOOOOOOOOOO
¬ε1 ◦ ε2(>)
ggOOOOOOOOOOO
77ooooooooooo
where ε1 ◦ ε2(b) = ε1 ◦ ε2(a) and ε1(x) = ε1 ◦ ε2(>).
The last proof is, similar to the proof of Proposition 16, easily seen to
hold. 
5.3.2 Other Kinds of Intensional Algebras
Having seen the previous sections, it should be clear that any class of algebras
weaker (in the sense, satisfying fever identities) or just as weak as complex al-
gebras may be used as intensional algebras without destroying the intensional
properties of the logic.
Each class of intensional algebras (maybe one should only consider equa-
tionally defined classes) formalizes a different conception of intensionality. For
example, under the intensional Boolean concept logic we have
|=BAO c u (d unionsq e) = (c u d) unionsq (c u e),
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meaning c u (d unionsq e) and (c u d) unionsq (c u e) are intensionally identified, because
every complex algebra satisfies the distributive law.13 This is the weakest
possible conception of intensionality, since any stronger axiomatization of
the intensional algebra means that the universal mapping property for the
corresponding free intensional algebra to the free extensional algebra would
not exist.
The strongest conception of intensionality arises when the intensional al-
gebra is the term algebra. Under this conception only syntactically identical
concept descriptions are identified, so not even c u (d u e) and (c u d) u e are
intensionally identified.
It seems natural to ask, then, what conception of intensionality we should
employ. Unfortunately, a general answer seems to be unattainable at the mo-
ment, and more investigations have to be carried out. Note, this is somewhat
similar to the situation in modal logic where we also have different modal-
ities for the different axiomatizations. The conception of intensionality in
which the intensional algebras are semilattices (Definition 14) seems relevant
for knowledge representation since it is the most general in which there is a
correspondence between conjunction and subsumption.
5.4 Generalizing the Logic
In the previous section we showed that the intensional algebra need not be
a semilattice. This enabled us to propose other versions of the intensional
concept logic. In this section we show another way in which the logic may be
altered.
We have already mentioned that our intensional logic follows Carnap’s
ideas about intensionality. We have accordingly extensional and intensional
algebras which give rise to two kinds of identities, = and ≡ (two kinds of
satisfaction). However, if we follow the Frege-Church conception, there are
not merely two levels of semantical entities but an infinite hierarchy instead.
We are actually also able to formalize this. Instead of letting an inten-
sional model be a pair of mappings, we let it be an infinite tuple of mappings
corresponding to the infinite hierarchy of senses. This can be defined as fol-
lows.
Let E be an extensional algebra and I1, I2, . . . be intensional algebras, then
a general intensional interpretation is a tuple (ε, ι1, ι2, . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . ) where
13This suggests that we can identify the intension of a concept c with the equivalence
class {d ∈ TC | |= c = d} in terms of a conception of intensionality. Carnap [1956] has
suggested something similar to this.
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ε : C → E, ιi : C → Ii and τi+1 : Ii+1 → Ii such that ιi = τi+1 ◦ ιi+1 and
ε = τ1 ◦ ι1. Moreover, all mappings must extend to homomorphism. The
relations between the mappings are illustrated in the commuting diagram
below
. . . I3
τ3
?
??
??
??
I2
τ2
?
??
??
??
I1
τ1
@
@@
@@
@@
C
ι3
II
ι2
>>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ι1
44iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
ε
// E
Notice the similarity with the illustration of Frege’s contribution (see page
25).
This means that we can define infinitely many intensional identities =1,=2
, . . . (instead of the single intensional identity = we had earlier). The defini-
tion of general-satisfaction is a generalization of the earlier definition of satis-
faction, such that a general intensional interpretation (ε, ι1, ι2, . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . )
satisfies c =j d if whenever i ≤ j then ι˜i(c) = ι˜i(d) (only mappings “less”
intensional than the j’th have to satisfy c =j d). Entailment is defined as
previously, but now we use the notation |=∞.
Now it should be clear that we have
c =j d |=∞ c =i d
and
c =i d 6|=∞ c =j d
for all i ≤ j, showing the intensional properties of the logic.
The Iis need not be intensional algebras, nor do they need to be of the same
definition. I1 could, for instance, be a complex algebra, and I2 a semilattice
and so on. In order for the intensional properties to hold, Ii+1 must be weaker
or just as weak as Ii.
Under this semantics there is no such thing as an intension of a concept—a
concept has an intension only with respect to a given level of the intensional
algebras (level of intensionality). This may appear strange at first (at least in
terms of Carnap’s semantical division into extensions and intensions), but in
terms of the Frege-Church conception it seems reasonable. It is accordingly
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probably more appropriate to call the members of I1 for senses instead of
intensions, and the members of I2 for sense senses and so on.
Note that the generalized formalization is coherent with Church’s axiom
(15mαβ), which asserts that function application preserves the concept of re-
lation (in Church’s terminology). To see this, let x and y be concepts of a
and b respectively, that is, let τ˜i+1(x) = a and τ˜i+1(y) = b, then since τ˜i+1
is homomorphic, we have for every function on senses, like for example ×i+1,
that
τ˜i+1(x×i+1 y) = τ˜i+1(x)×i τ˜i+1(y) = a×i b,
showing that x×i+1 y is a concept of a×i b. In other words, axiom (15mαβ)
corresponds in our framework to the fact that the mediations are homomor-
phic.
If we consider the proof of soundness and completeness (Section 5.2.9), it
should be clear that it may be generalized to the general intensional concept
logic, where we have infinitely many kinds of identities. We “only” need an
Intensionality proof rule for each level of intensionality:
c =i+1 d
c =i d
, i = 1, 2, . . .
It should also be clear that the soundness and completeness results hold no
matter how the intensional algebras are axiomatized (as long as Ii+1 is weaker
than Ii or just as weak, of course). In other words, we have vast number
(infinitely many) of sound and complete concept logics.
Each axiomatization of the intensional algebras may be associated with a
conception of intensionality, as already noted. Let us consider the class of all
concept identities entailed by the empty set of concept axioms under a given
conception of intensionality (for example aub = bua belongs to the conception
in which intensional algebras are semilattices, Definition 14). A well-known
result of universal algebra says that if we want to determine whether a con-
cept axiom belongs to the class, it suffices to make interpretations over the
free algebra over the class (because the free algebra has the universal map-
ping property). This means that each conception of intensionality may be
associated with the corresponding free algebra.
This leads to a natural way of ordering the different notions of intension-
ality. Let us index the free algebras corresponding to the different notions of
intensionality by a set K. Define an ordering on K by k ≤ l iff there is a
(unique) map FlC → FkC , where FkC and FlC are the free algebras associated
with the k’th and l’th conception of intensionality. By the fact that we have
identity mappings on the free algebras, by the unique mapping property for
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free algebras, and by the fact that maps commute, it should be clear that ≤
is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. Hence (K,≤) is a partial order
(and not merely a chain). This ordering formulates the relations between the
different notions of intensionality, because if k ≤ l, then
T |= c =l d implies T |= c =k d.
In other words, we can order conceptions of intensionality. It should then be
clear that the algebraic semantics sheds new light on intensionality.
Among all the different notions of intensionality, it should be clear that the
three we have described earlier have a special status: the term algebra TC(∅)
is maximum in this order, and the free algebra over the class of codomains of
the first coordinate of the intensional Boolean models (described in Section
5.3.1) is minimum, and FIC (described in Section 5.2.10) is the greatest in
which there is a one-to-one correspondence between subsumption and con-
junction.
Finally it should be noted that we have shown that we have a class of
logics of which some are in accordance with Carnap’s method of extension
and intension and some are in accordance with the Frege-Church conception.
5.5 Remarks about the Intensional Concept Logics
Although we have not shown how, it should be fairly obvious that we can
define intensional semantics of other description logics than ALC by using
an approach similar to the ones described above. Moreover, the underlying
approach of the intensional semantics may, with some corrections, be used
for other kinds of logics than description logics. Such extensions are not
easy to formalize and presuppose that the approach is modified even further,
however, in order to show that it can be done, we have defined an intensional
propositional logic based on the Frege-Church conception of intensionality.
The logic can be found in Appendix A. The result that it subsumes modal
logic T is also shown.
Although computational properties play a significant role in description
logic, we have not focused on this issue in the present work. However, we can
establish that the complexity of the intensional Boolean concept logic is the
same as that of ALC. More precisely, the decision problem of determining
if c ∼= d belongs to the set of concept axioms which is entailed by T , i.e.
determining if T |=BAO c ∼= d, is ExpTime-complete. To see this, recall from
the completeness proof that we can divide a set of concept axioms T in two,
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T E = {c ≡ d | c ≡ d ∈ T } and T I = {c ≡ d | c = d ∈ T }, such that
T |=BAO c = d if and only if T I |=ALC c ≡ d
and
T |=BAO c ≡ d if and only if T I ∪ T E |=ALC c ≡ d.
This shows that in order to determine whether a concept axiom is entailed
by T we can use the entailment relation of ALC (and conversely). The two
decision problems must therefore belong to the same complexity class.
This result does not only hold for the intensional Boolean concept logic, it
holds also for the general intensional concept logic (where we have an infinite
hierarchy of intensional algebras) presupposing that each of the intensional
algebras are complex algebras. To see this, let n be the highest level of
intensionality we find in a set of concept axioms T , that is, for all c =i d ∈ T
we have i ≤ n. Then we can define general-satisfaction only by means of
n numbers of mappings into intensional algebras. Let us use the notation
|=n for the entailment relation which is defined in terms of interpretations
consisting of tuples (ε, ι1, . . . , ιn, τ1, . . . , τn). Then we see that T |=∞ c =i d,
where i ≤ n if and only if T |=n c =i d, since there are no concept axioms in
T which has a higher level of intensionality than n. Hence it should be clear
that we can make a similar construction as the one above (but now we need n
sets of concept axioms instead of just T I and T E), meaning that this decision
problem also belongs to the same complexity class as ALC. This is interesting
because it shows that we have a decidable logic based on the Frege-Church
conception.
From a practical point of view (if one wants to implement the logics and
use them for formalizing ontologies) the fact that entailment is ExpTime-
complete, which is often considered to be intractable, need not be a serious
problem. Because there exist efficient implementations of description logics
even more expressive (more complex) thanALC, see e.g. [Haarslev and Mo¨ller,
2001; Horrocks and Sattler, 2002]. The proposed intensional concept logics
provide therefore a viable alternative to the extensional concept logics.
5.6 Applications
The expressiveness of the intensional concept logic is higher than the ex-
pressiveness of the description logic ALC. This should be clear because the
intensional algebras may be weaker than the extensional algebras of ALC,
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moreover, the expressiveness is higher because we have a logic with two no-
tions of equivalence. This means that there is a number of novel applications
of the intensional concept logic. This section describes some of these.
First of all, we have an obvious application of the intensional concept logic
in that we are able to discern between co-extensional concepts. As already
noted, it means that we, for example, can assert
bachelor ≡ lonely hearted,
i.e. that bachelors are the lonely hearted, without this entails that bachelor
and lonely hearted are identified in the concept logic, for we have
bachelor ≡ lonely hearted 6|= bachelor = lonely hearted.
Similarly,
creature u ∃has-part.heart ≡ creature u ∃has-part.kidney
captures the earlier mentioned co-extensionality of creature with a heart and
creature with a kidney without identifying the two concepts.14
The two kinds of identity and the two kinds of subsumption provide us
with a logic which can be used to formalize more well-structured taxonomies
(i.e. also more well-structured ontologies). In a series of papers, Guarino and
Welty, see e.g. [Welty and Guarino, 2001], have introduced a methodology
for constructing more well-structured taxonomies. The methodology consists
in removing, adding, or rearranging subsumption vertices (is-a links) which
are found not to be acceptable in terms of philosophically motivated meta-
properties. It would take us too far afield to go into details about this, so we
merely illustrate the possibilities by means of an example from [Welty and
Guarino, 2001].
In a given taxonomy apple is asserted to be a subconcept of both fruit and
food. Now they suggest that in a more properly structured ontology apple
is only a subconcept of fruit. Unfortunately, this means that the knowledge
that an apple is a kind of food is removed from the taxonomy. However,
for applications within e.g. nutrition, this knowledge is quite relevant. So it
would be nice if we did not have to give it up. By means of our two kinds of
subsumption, their proposal can be captured without giving up knowledge:
apple ≤ fruit
apple v food.
14Here we have formalized the relation by means of value restrictions. This ensures that
the part (the heart and kidney) exists, however, if one wants to say that exactly one part
exists, we need to use more expressive description logics.
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Unlike the first taxonomy, this does not mess up the taxonomy, because the
two kinds of knowledge are clearly separated. In a graphical presentation of
the taxonomy, extensional relations could for instance be removable.
This rearranging may appear arbitrary at first, but it is interesting to
note that researchers in terminology, which is a different, more linguistic
research area (see e.g. [Madsen, 1999]), employ a somewhat similar division
when discerning between
• the characteristic (defining) attributes, and
• the supplementary attributes
of a concept. An characteristic attribute, for example that an apple contains
(has part) seeds, could in the intensional logic be formalized as
apple = apple u ∃has-part.seed .
A supplementary attribute, like the fact that an apple may be eaten, could
be formalized as
apple ≡ apple u food .
Here we could also have used roles. Notice the different use of intensional and
extensional relations.15
This shows that the intensional concept logic supports at least some of
the non-classical principles (which description logics do not support) that
modellers working with construction of ontologies adopt in practice in order
to represent and reason with concepts.
There are other applications of the intensional concept logic. In the fol-
lowing we show some examples.
5.6.1 Multi-Knowledge-Based Systems
Now we describe the example mentioned in Chapter 1 in more details. The
application is called multi-knowledge-based systems because we show how to
unify different knowledge bases by means of the intensional concept logic.
Assume we have a knowledge base which is considered to give a correct
formalization of a given domain, but not a complete formalization in the sense
that there are additional facts about the domain to be formalized. One may
15As always, this could have been formalized differently. In a general ontology we would
probably define fruit to have seeds as attribute, and this would then by inheritance entails
that apple has seeds.
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therefore want the users of the knowledge base to alter it (or maybe only
privileged users—we abstract from such technical details).
However, as it probably takes a lot of resources to construct the knowledge
base in the first place (and to keep it up-to-date as well), one would like some
sort of protection, especially since it can be very easy to make the knowledge
base inconsistent and thereby useless.
If we, for example, have a rule saying c ≡ d and someone adds c ≡ ¬d then
we have an inconsistent knowledge base, from which any conclusion might be
drawn, hence a useless knowledge base since c ≡ d, c ≡ ¬d |= e ≡ f for all
e, f ∈ Tc.16
To make this less speculative, let us imagine that Alice, an expert on wines,
owns a wine shop. Through years of studies, Alice has made a comprehensive
wine ontology, describing different types of wines, like
wine type
red wine
33ggggggggggggggggggggggggg
white wine
66mmmmmmmmmmmmm
dessert wine
OO
sparkling wine
iiSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
Moscato D’Asti
OO 55llllllllllllll
Champagne
OO
Different wine producing areas ranging from countries to wine fields, like:17
wine area
France
77nnnnnnnnnnnn
Germany
OO
Bordeaux
66mmmmmmmmmmmmmm
Champagne
OO
Mosel
OO
Margaux
77nnnnnnnnnnnn
Saint-Emilion
OO
Erden
OO
Pra¨lat
OO
16Note that inconsistencies may arise in less obvious ways, and that it is not only incon-
sistencies that may harm the knowledge base.
17Notice that it need not be a trivial assignment to construct ontologies, Champagne is
for instance used both as a region and a wine type.
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It should be noted that in this example we formalize knowledge in a special
way such that everything is formalized as concepts (to keep things simple).
For example, the wine areas are formalized by means of the subsumption
relation such that
Bordeaux ≤ France.
It is probably more appropriate to formalize these relations by means of a
part-of relation, like part-of(Bordeaux, France) (but this is not crucial for
the example).
Different types of grapes, like Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Chardonnay,
Riesling are also represented. Now, we could have a rule stating that all wines
made from the Riesling grape are either white wines or dessert wines.
∀made from.Riesling ≤ white wine unionsq dessert wine.
The wine producers follow many rules and traditions. Being a passionate
wine expert (drinker) has left Alice with little time to address this aspect of
the wine world, and since she moreover finds this part tedious, she has left it to
the users of her knowledge base (which could include her customers) to define
this part. Alice has no time to control that all the rules and data entered are
correct, so in order to protect her ontology, the users enter their knowledge
by means of the extensional relations (≡,v), whereas she uses (=,≤).
Now, some user adds the rule that every wine from the Erden village is
made from the Riesling grape:
Erden v ∀made from.Riesling .
Notice that the users (including Alice) do not even have to know that there
are both extensional and intensional relations, because they can only use one
relation.
The knowledge about wines may be combined with the customers needs.
Users can accordingly add information about what kind of wines they like,
such that Alice can order the wines which the customers like, inform users
about special sales, wine tastings of their favorite wines etc. For expressing
favorite wines the likes relation is used. Bob likes dessert wines and white
wines, he therefore asserts
dessert wine unionsq white wine v ∃likes.Bob.
One day Alice gets a special dessert wine for sale, an Erdener Pra¨lat
Beerenauslese, which Alice simply calls EPBA. This wine comes from the
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Pra¨lat wine field, so Alice adds
EPBA ≤ Pra¨lat.
Let us call the entire wine knowledge base including both Alice’s ontology
and the users contributions for W. Now, we have
W |= EPBA v ∃likes.Bob
meaning that it can be deduced that Bob will like EPBA. Notice how we, in
order to derive this, must use both Alice’s ontology and the user contributions.
Notice also that we have
W 6|= EPBA ≤ ∃likes.Bob.
In such cases Alice (or Bob) can see that the deduction presupposes exten-
sional knowledge (supplied by the users), which means that it is possible to
ascribe less importance to the result.
The production size of dessert wines like EPBA may be microscopic al-
though the demand for such wines is high. A character like Alice has a special
principle which keeps the prices on these wines, the so-called rarities, from
rising to astronomical heights. Alice insists on only selling rarities to specially
selected customers. And by means of the following rule
∀buy .rarity ≤ selected customer
she can enforce this system.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Alice’s ontology is protected from the incorrect
rules users may add. For instance, if Bob in despair over not being allowed
to buy EPBA adds
EPBA ≡ ¬EPBA,
and causes the extensional part of the knowledge base to be inconsistent, the
intensional part remain (and he is therefore still prevented from buying the
wine).18
The system need not be divided into two parts only, it may be divided
into an arbitrary number of parts. This could be necessary if the staff of the
wine shop and wine producers also may add rules. In such cases we have to
18Nevertheless, it should be noted that inconsistencies (of course) are harmful to the
system, they are just not as harmful as in a usual system.
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use the logic with n-equivalence relations (see Section 5.4), but the principles
are the same.19
This describes some of the possibilities of how the intensional logic can
be used to formalize integrations of several knowledge bases. The logic is
of course only really useful in the cases where some of the knowledge bases
are ordered (ascribed different modalities). As another (more important)
domain, we have a health care system, with doctors, nurses, patients, visitors,
medicine, patient records, prescriptions, schedulings of operations, etc. (In
this domain there is also an ordering of the users and their knowledge.)
This shows that the intensional concept logic is useful for these applica-
tions, because it allows different kinds of knowledge to be united, and yet
keep them discernible.
As far as we know, no other decidable logic would be able do what we
have described above.20
5.6.2 Intensional Subsumption
Now we describe different ways to understand the intensional relations, in
particular, the difference between extensional subsumption and intensional
subsumption. As already noted, ≤ is to be used as an intensional subsumption
relation, and v as an extensional subsumption relation.
It should be clear that different roles are ascribed to the extensional and
intensional axioms. They may therefore be interpreted as modalities. Then
it should be clear that we may interpret c = d as expressing a necessary rela-
tionship between c and d, whereas c ≡ d expresses a contingent relationship.
We could for example have the following
bachelor = unmarried uman (5.3)
bachelor ≡ lonely hearted. (5.4)
which entails that bachelor is an intensional subconcept of man (and unmar-
ried), hence
bachelor ≤ man
19Note we could also have had one equivalence relation for each user, such that every user
is protected from the other users.
20It should be noted that the above example only employs closed world reasoning. The
particular examples could therefore be successfully implemented in a logic programming
language. However, in general, where we have ABoxes, such implementations may not give
sound answers.
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but it does not entail that bachelor is an intensional subconcept of lonely
hearted, that is, we have
bachelor 6≤ lonely hearted.
But we have of course that bachelor is an extensional subconcept of lonely
hearted
bachelor v lonely hearted.
The intensional relations can alternatively be used for expressing con-
cept definitions (this is related to the approach employed in terminology with
its characteristic and supplementary attributes). For example, vitamin-C is
defined as a vitamin, therefore we know by definition that vitamin-C is a
subconcept of vitamin, in which case we write
vitamin-C ≤ vitamin.
However, the knowledge that vitamin C inhibits oxidation, that is, that
vitamin-C is an antioxidant follows from empirical investigations (chemical
experiments). In this case we would therefore use the extensional relation
and write
vitamin-C v antioxidant.
5.6.3 Intensional ABoxes and Prototype Theory
The intensional semantics has only been defined for concept axioms, that is,
for TBoxes. Now we show how to define an intensional semantic for concept
assertions, that is, for ABoxes.21
Just as the intensional semantics for TBoxes needed two kinds of expres-
sions for discerning between extensional and intensional knowledge, we need
two kinds of membership assertions. The extensional concept assertion is the
usual concept assertion of ALC, where we by writing c(a) express that the
individual a is a member of the concept c. The intensional concept assertion
has the following notation
c[a],
21The reason why this semantics is described as an application of the logic is that not
all details are worked out. Moreover, the contributions described in Chapter 2, which
formed the basis for the intensional semantics, do not seem to acknowledge intensionality
on the levels of individuals (note, we are not talking about individual concepts but about
individuals of the domain of interpretation).
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which should be read as: a is an intensional member of c (we later describe
what this is to mean).
For defining the intensional semantics of ABoxes we use the same approach
as when we defined the intensional semantics of TBoxes: intensionality arises
through algebraic abstraction. Recall, under the extensional semantics c(a)
is satisfied by an ALC interpretation (·)I if aI ∈ cI . Since it is not particular
important, we skip membership of roles (r(a, b)); and once the first is defined,
the other follows by means of products of algebras.
Now we can define the semantics. Let A be the set of individuals. An
extensional interpretation is a mapping ε : C∪A→ 2U such that for all a ∈ A,
ε(a) is an atom of U . Moreover, ε must extend to a homomorphism on C.
Then ε satisfies c[a] if ε(a) ⊆ ε˜(c) and ε satisfies c(a) if ε(a) ⊆ ε˜(c). The
interpretation is an extensional model if it satisfies all concept axioms and
concept assertions.
An intensional interpretation is a pair (ι : C ∪ A → I, τ : I → 2U ),
where 2U is a complex algebra and I is an intensional algebra (of appropriate
conception) such that for all a ∈ A, ι(a) is a generator of I and τ ◦ ι(a) is an
atom of U . Moreover, ι must extend to a homomorphism on C and τ ◦ ι must
be an extensional model. Then c[a] is satisfied by (ι, τ) if ι(a) = ι(a) × ι˜(c)
(recall, this means that ι(a) is less than or equal to ι˜(c)). An intensional
model is an intensional interpretation which satisfies all concept identities
and intensional concept assertions.
Now it is easy to see that we have for all a ∈ A, c ∈ TC
c[a] |= c(a). (5.5)
On the other hand we have
c(a) 6|= c[a]. (5.6)
To see this, consider
ι(>)
ι(a)
<<yyyyyyyy
ι˜(c)
ccHHHHHHHHH
x
::tttttttttt
ccGGGGGGGGG
∼ x
ddIIIIIIIII
∼ ι(>)
ddJJJJJJJJJJ
::uuuuuuuuu
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where ∼ x = ∼ ι(a), x = ∼∼ x, ι˜(c) = ∼∼ ι˜(c), and ∼ ι˜(c) = ∼ ι(>) and
τ˜ ◦ ι˜(>) = τ˜ ◦ ι˜(c)
τ˜ ◦ ι˜(a) = τ˜(x)
55kkkkkkkkkkkkkk
¬τ˜ ◦ ι˜(a)
hhQQQQQQQQQQQQ
¬τ˜ ◦ ι˜(>)
iiSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
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which form an intensional model of c(a). We verify, amongst other things,
that c[a] is not satisfied because ι(a)× ι˜(c) = x 6= ι(a).
These two results, (5.5) and (5.6), can be seen as intensionality results for
ABoxes in that they show that intensional membership implies extensional
membership (but not conversely).
How should intensional membership be understood? If T |= c[a] then we
may think of a as a prototypical member of c, that is, a member which is a
particular good example or representative of the concept c. Within cognitive
science there is a theory called prototype theory, where one works with this
distinction, see e.g. [Hampton, 1993]. For example, a prototypical wine could
be a common red wine, in contrast to an aromatic dessert wine like EPBA. In
order to capture these ideas we actually need to have an infinity of different
degrees of membership, but the presented theory can easily be generalized to
capture this if we follow the approach described in Section 5.4. (It should not
be necessary to show all the technicalities.)
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear that this provides an appropriate for-
malization of prototype theory (if anything does), because by the definitions
above, we have the following
c ≤ d, c[a] |= d[a]
which, for example, means that if we assert that EPBA is a prototypical
dessert wine then this entails that it is also a prototypical wine, and this does
not seem to be in fully accordance with prototype theory.
5.6.4 Content-Based Information Retrieval
Now we change subject to information retrieval. Information retrieval is about
selecting data which are similar to a given query. Information retrieval is for
example used by search engines on the Web. Similarity is (most often) deter-
mined by comparing two words with each other. In traditional key word based
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information retrieval, words are judged to be similar if they are identical. In
the OntoQuery research project (see www.ontoquery.dk), a more elaborate
strategy based upon ontologies is used. Basically, similarity is determined by
measuring the distance (the number of vertices) between the corresponding
nodes in the ontology.
Assume we have the following part of a nutrition ontology
nutrient
vitamin
OO
antioxidant
vitamin-C
ggOOOOOOOOOOO
66nnnnnnnnnnnn
Then it should be clear that vitamin-C is more similar to vitamin than nutri-
ent. This means that if one requests information about nutrient, one is more
likely to get information about vitamin than information about vitamin C.
(Of course one is most likely to get information about nutrient, but in case
there is no, vitamin is retrieved.)
By means of the intensional concept logic this can be refined even further.
This is simply done by asserting that the distances between intensional sub-
sumption relations are less than corresponding extensional relations. If we
follow the previous example, where vitamin-C is an extensional subconcept
of antioxidant and an intensional subconcept of vitamin, it means that if one
requests information about vitamin C, one is more likely to get information
about vitamin than antioxidant. This does seem acceptable.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
An intensional logic for representing and reasoning with concepts has been
presented. The logic was based on the description logic ALC which we aug-
mented with an intensional equivalence relation. It was given an algebraic
semantics, but despite the technical details, the underlying principle of the
intensional semantics was strikingly simple: we considered simply pairs (in
the general case, tuples) of commuting models, instead of merely single mod-
els as one usually does. By letting the codomain of the first model be weaker
(more general) than the codomain of the second, it was shown that we obtain
an intensional logic.
It was shown that a wealth of different versions of this semantics ex-
ists, and that the underlying principle, with some modifications, can be used
for other kinds of logics than description logics. The intensional semantics
proposes therefore a general approach for formalizing intensionality in which
intensionality arises through abstraction (generalization) of properties. This
may at first appear unmotivated, but the relation between abstraction and
concepts (intensional entities) has actually been known for a long time. For
example, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole assert page 38 of [1996] (first
edition published in 1662):1
if I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, and if I con-
centrate on examine it on this paper alone with all the accidental
1Note, many things have changed since then, and what they call idea is related to what
we call concept.
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circumstances determining it, I shall have an idea of only a single
triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus
on the thought that the triangle is a figure bounded by three equal
lines, the idea I form will [...], be able to represent all equilateral
triangles. Suppose I go further and, ignoring the equalities of lines,
I consider it only as a figure bounded by three straight lines. I
will then form an idea that can represent all kinds of triangles.
Now we touch upon the issue of related work once again. From a general
perspective, the present work is related to many of other theories in that we
have proposed a logic with two connectives, = and ≡, interpreted as equiva-
lence relations such that the former is a subset of the latter. This occurs for
example in some modal logics. In T we have that (φ ↔ ψ) → (φ ↔ ψ) is
valid, showing that strict equivalence implies equivalence. As another exam-
ple, Peter Aczel and Solomon Feferman [1980] have proposed a logic with an
intensional equivalence operator. Our work is also related to formal concept
analysis, however, it is not yet clear to what extend. The present work ap-
pears, amongst other things, to be distinguished by its algebraic semantics and
its (the general concept logic of Section 5.4) connection to the Frege-Church
conception of intensionality with its infinite hierarchy of senses.
Future work include a more thorough comparison between the present
approach and related approaches. There is also work to be done on investi-
gating how the underlying intensional semantics can be applied to other kinds
of logics. Part of this work has already been carried out as shown in Appendix
A. There is also work to be done on implementing the intensional concept
logic. It is for example not clear whether the current tableau algorithms of
description logics offer the most efficient implementation.
Appendix A
A Logic of Sense and Denotation
The underlying approach of our intensional semantics may, with some modifi-
cations, be used for other kinds of logic than description logics. Now we show
how it can be used for defining a propositional logic that allows a distinction
between sense and denotation.
The syntax of the present logic is that of propositional logic with an addi-
tional unary connective [·]. [φ] should be read as: the sense of φ is the sense
of >, where > is the nullary connective which is interpreted as true. [φ↔ ψ]
should be read as: φ and ψ have the same sense. Frege asserted that sense
determines denotation, in the present logic this becomes formalized as:
[φ]→ φ
is valid.
In the following let P be the set of propositional letters. The formal
definition of the semantics is given below.
Definition 22 An S-interpretation is a tuple (ε0 : P → E0, ε1 : P →
E1, . . . , τ1 : E1 → E0, τ2 : E2 → E1, . . . ) where for every i ∈ N, (Ei,∧i,¬i, 1i)
is a Boolean algebra and τi+1 ◦ εi+1 = εi and εi extends to a homomorphism,
that is, it satisfies
εi(>) = 1i
εi(φ ∧ ψ) = εi(φ) ∧i εi(ψ)
εi(¬φ) = ¬i εi(φ),
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and
εi([φ]) =
{
1i if εi+1(φ) = 1i+1
0i otherwise.
The idea is that a formula which does not contain any [·] is interpreted in
E0, such that the formula is true if it is true in E0, i.e., equal to 10. It
should be clear that we then obtain the classical propositional tautologies.
Moreover, a formula enclosed in a single [·] is interpreted in E1, such that the
whole formula is true if it is true in E1, i.e., equal to 11. E1 formulates the
domain of the senses of an interpretation. Formulas enclosed in nested [·] are
interpreted similarly by means of the Ei’s.
It can easily be shown that τi is a Boolean homomorphism (when its
domain is restricted to the image of εi).
Definition 23 A formula φ is S-valid if for every S-interpretation
(ε0, ε1, . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . ) we have ε0(φ) = 10.
As an example we get that [φ] → φ is S-valid. If ε1(φ) = 11 then by
applying τ1, we have τ1(ε1(φ)) = τ1(11), which by commutativity and the
fact that τ1 preserves bounds since it is a homomorphism yields ε0(φ) = 10.
So, ε0([φ]→ φ) = 10. In the other case where ε1(φ) 6= 11 we get by definition
that ε0([φ]) = 00, meaning ε0([φ] → φ) = 10. In all cases [φ] → φ is true in
E0, thus it is S-valid.
As another example we see that φ → [φ] is not S-valid. As a counter
model we have
11
ε1(p)
<<yyyyyyyy
•
__????????
ε0(p) = 10
01
@@        
bbDDDDDDDDD
ε0([p]) = 00
OO
E1 E0
Verifying that we have commutativity, we have ¬0ε0(p)∨0 ε0([p]) = 00, mean-
ing that the formula p→ [p] is not S-valid.
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In a similar way we can show that
(φ↔ ψ)→ ([φ]↔ [ψ])
is not S-valid, meaning that the logic of sense and denotation is intensional.
A.1 Relation to Modal Logic T
It is natural to compare the logic of sense and denotation with modal logic.
There is a natural translation of a modal logic formula φ to a formula φ′ of
the logic of sense and denotation, by mapping ψ to [ψ] and otherwise map
ψ to ψ.
The following theorem shows a relation between the logics.
Theorem 24 If φ is a formula valid in modal logic T, then the translated
formula φ′ is S-valid.
Proof. We must show that the axioms of T are S-valid, and that the inference
rules of T preserve S-validity.
The translation of the K-axiom [φ→ ψ]→ ([φ]→ [ψ]) is S-valid, because
if ε0([φ→ ψ]) = 10, that is, if ε1(φ) ≤1 ε1(ψ), then if ε0([φ]) = 10, that is, if
ε1(φ) = 11, we get ε1(ψ) = 11, meaning ε0([ψ]) = 10. Hence ε0([φ] → [ψ]) =
10.
The translation of the T-axiom, [φ]→ φ, is S-valid as shown in the example
above.
If φ is a tautology of propositional logic then φ is S-valid, since propo-
sitional logic may be interpreted over any Boolean algebra as a well-known
result shows.
If φ→ ψ is S-valid then ε0(φ) ≤0 ε0(ψ) and if φ is S-valid then ε0(φ) = 10.
Therefore ε0(ψ) = 10 meaning ψ is S-valid.
If φ is S-valid and (ε0, ε1, ε2, . . . , τ1, τ2, τ3, . . . ) is any S-interpretation, then
we get that (ε1, ε2, . . . , τ2, τ3, . . . ) is an S-interpretation, so we must have
ε1(φ) = 11 meaning that ε0([φ]) = 10. Thus [φ] is S-valid.
We show that uniform substitutions preserve S-validity. Let x be a propo-
sitional letter (variable), and let φ(ψ/x) denote the result of substituting
every occurrence of x with ψ in φ. Assume φ is S-valid. Given an S-
interpretation (ε0, ε1, . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . ) in which εi(ψ) = mi, we have an S-
interpretation (ε′0, ε′1 . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . ) defined by ε′i(x) = mi, otherwise ε
′
i = εi.
We verify that (ε′0, ε′1 . . . , τ1, τ2, . . . ) is an S-interpretation in that
τi+1(ε′i+1(x)) = τi+1(mi+1) = τi+1(εi+1(ψ)) = εi(ψ) = ε
′
i(x).
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Now we see that ε′i(φ) = εi(φ(ψ/x)) for all i. We proceed on induction on
the structure of φ. If φ is equal to a propositional letter y, then for all i if
y = x, ε′i(y) = mi = εi(ψ), otherwise ε
′
i(y) = εi(ψ) for all i. For conjunctions
we have for all i, ε′i(φ
′ ∧φ′′) = ε′i(φ′)∧i ε′i(φ′′) = εi(φ′(ψ/x))∧i εi(φ′′(ψ/x)) =
εi((φ′ ∧ φ′′)(ψ/x)). For negations we have for all i, ε′i(¬φ) = ¬iε′i(φ) =
¬iεi(φ(ψ/x)) = εi(¬φ(ψ/x)). For necessitation we have for all i
ε′i([φ]) = 1i if and only if
ε′i+1(φ) = 1i+1 if and only if
εi+1(φ(ψ/x)) = 1i+1 if and only if
εi([φ](ψ/x)) = 1i.
Then, since φ is S-valid, we have ε0(φ(ψ/x)) = ε′0(φ) = 10. Thus φ(ψ/x) is
S-valid. 
The logic of sense and denotation is therefore a normal modal logic. It is
not yet clear whether the logic of sense and denotation is subsumed by T.
The definitions 22 and 23 may be altered, which may give rise to different
kinds of logics of sense and denotation. If we only have one sense domain, or
more precisely, if all sense domains Ei for i > 1 are isomorphic then it should
be clear that [φ]→ [[φ]] becomes valid. In this case, it appears that the modal
logic S4, which satisfies φ → φ, is captured. Further alternations may
capture other, more stronger, modal logics.
It does not appear to be possible to capture weaker modal logics than T,
like K, because in the logic of sense and denotation, it must be the case, as
mentioned in Section 2.1, that we have a mapping from the sense domain to
their denotations, that is, we must have a mapping τi. Moreover τi extends
to a homomorphism, so [φ]→ φ, which corresponds to axiom T, will be valid.
It is also possible to change the system such that we for sure will know
that the logic we obtain is not equivalent to or subsumes a normal modal
logic. If the sense domains, for instance, are weaker than Boolean algebras
(as we have in the intensional concept logic, where there is one sense domain
which is a semilattice) then we obtain a logic which does not subsume T,
because we fail to have what corresponds to a necessitation rule, i.e. if φ is a
propositional tautology then we do not necessarily have [φ]. This shows that
the system in this sense is richer than modal logics.
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